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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is an analytic and systematic philosophical study of ethical 
idealism of the type developed by F.H. Bradley. The research fills the 
interpretative gap resulting from the fact that the book has mostly been discussed 
either from the standpoint of political and social philosophy, or the history of 
philosophy. Psychological interpretations may be insightful, but are lacking in 
analytic approach. No major in-depWh anal\Wical inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V eWhicV 
has been undertaken from the standpoint of moral philosophy. The uniqueness 
of this study lies in its exclusive focus on the key concepWV of BUadle\¶V moUal 
psychology, normative ethics, and meta-ethics. It reconstructs, analyses, and 
interprets his ethics on the basis of Ethical Studies (ES) (and minor works in 
moral psychology) and offers a new analytic reading of the book. This amounts to 
a re-eYalXaWion and UeconVideUaWion of Whe VWandaUd inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V 
ethical views, and their Vignificance foU eWhicV. The diVVeUWaWion moYeV BUadle\¶V 
under-researched work into the context of present-day ethical debates, and, by 
doing so, recovers its significance as a ground-breaking early analytic text with 
implications for moral psychology, ontology, epistemology, and normative ethics.  
 
Adopting an analytic approach to ES, this study moves away from the usual focus 
on the traditional methods of the history of philosophy. The dissertation instead 
focuses on the elucidation of the key questions of ES, the explication of its main 
ideas, and the connection between them, as well as connecting these ideas to 
ethical problems, rather than on tracing the development of ideas and concepts, 
describing tendencies, and putting ideas in historical perspective, or connecting 
BUadle\¶V YieZV Wo particular schools of philosophy or individual thinkers. As a 
result, the research breaks away from the tradiWional inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V 
ethics and UejecWV iWV common aVVXmpWionV. BUadle\¶V YieZs are identified not 
merely as an idealistic ethics, i.e. one of the varied moral views held by 
metaphysical idealists, but rather as a version of ethical idealism that claims that 
the goal of a moral life must be understood as the realisation of the moral ideal 
for its own sake.  
 
The dissertation consists of five peer-reviewed articles that form a coherent 
narrative. It begins by challenging the assumption that, for Bradley, social 
requirements equal moral obligations, and undermining the long-standing belief 
aboXW Whe cenWUal Uole of ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´. Ne[W, Whe diVVeUWaWion WXUnV 
to the key concept of ES, i.e. the moral self, which is explained in terms of personal 
pUojecWV. ThiV concepW iV fXUWheU connecWed Wo BUadle\¶V accoXnW of deViUe, and iW 
is suggested that grand desires, i.e. desires directed towards an ideal of one¶V 
peUVonaliW\, aUe impoUWanW foU Whe XndeUVWanding of BUadle\¶V idea of Velf-
realisation and the moral life. Lastly, it UeconVWUXcWV BUadle\¶V YieZV on moUal 
motivation and the nature of moral beliefs.  
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1. A NeZ ReadiQg Rf BUadle\¶V Ethical Studies 
ThiV diVVeUWaWion UeconVWUXcWV and inWeUpUeWV F.H. BUadle\¶V moUal YieZV aV 
presented in Ethical Studies (hereafter²ES) (1876/1962). ES is BUadle\¶V 
main work on moral philosophy and also his first major book.1 It precedes his 
metaphysical work Appearance and Reality (hereafter²AR) (1959/1987) by 
almost twenty years. Despite being, as B. Bosanquet termed it, an ³epoch 
making book´ (BoVanTXeW, 1957, p. 159) WhaW TXickl\ gained popXlaUiW\ 
among the majority of British moral philosophers, ES remains a poorly 
researched work. This is paradoxical, because it was the first in-depth 
representation of idealistic ethics in the Anglo-American world (Mander, 
2010, Schneewind, 1977). Many philosophers, such as J. Dewey (1891), J.H. 
Muirhead (1892), J.S. Mackenzie (1901), and J. Seth (1894), drew from ES 
to develop their idealistic theories, and reactions to it lead to the 
deYelopmenW of anal\Wic moUal philoVoph\ b\ BUadle\¶V foUmeU diVcipleV 
G.E. Moore and B. Russell. Despite its merits, there is no systematic and 
analytic study of ES, which is a considerable gap in the history of ethics and 
the philosophy of mind. The complexity of its topics, its radically new 
approach to ethical questions, as well as its notoriously difficult style,2 may 
explain why until now there has been no serious attempt to analyse it in 
depth. Moreover, its language is challenging because the vocabulary of 
moral psychology had not yet solidified at the time of its writing. I do not 
imply that nothing is being written on ES (for a detailed review, refer to Section 
V); Whe inWeUeVW in BUadle\¶V eWhicV haV been conVWanWl\ UiVing oYeU Whe paVW 
thirty years. The philosophical literature is full of references to and short 
passages and chapters on ES, most of which are quite repetitive, and lack any 
in-depth considerations. One reason for this shortcoming is an interpretation 
gap, due to the fact that the book fell out of fashion. As a result, much of what 
haV UecenWl\ been ZUiWWen on BUadle\¶V eWhicV can be WUaced back Wo Whe eaUlieU 
commentators. No substantial revision has been made since that time. Most 
of the ideas Bradley expressed in his ES, however, were well ahead of his time, 
and were not properly acknowledged or developed by the earlier 
commentators. ES remains largely disconnected from the present-day 
discussions on moral philosophy. Thus, there is a need for a new, up-to-date 
 
1 BUadle\¶V fiUVW pXbliVhed ZoUk ZaV a pamphlet, The Presuppositions of Critical History, in 
1874, UepUinWed in BUadle\¶V Collected Essays (1935/1969). 
2 MandeU, foU inVWance, makeV WhiV commenW on BUadle\¶V VW\le: ³One of Whe moVW diVWincWiYe 
things about the book was style, which is bold, lovely, and picturesque. It still makes a great 
read. But while that may commend it to us, as literature, it must be confessed that, as 
philosophy, and especially to modern reading tastes, it can make its import hard to follow. 
BUadle\¶V ideaV and WeUminolog\ aUe ofWen alien and XnfamiliaU, hiV aUgXments are often 
compressed, while his aims²even at times his conclusions²are often implicit. Moreover the 
book is highly polemical and, while this makes for writing that is smart and full of memorable 
turns of phrase it makes at the same time for writing which is often far from lucid; too 
frequently he descends into ridicule of opponents when what is really wanted is argument or 
e[planaWion.´ (Mander, 2011, p. 182) 
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re-interpretation of the book which will do justice to the complexity and 
current importance of its topics and arguments.  
In addition, ES remain known and discussed mostly from the standpoint of 
the history of philosophy (e.g., by J.H. Muirhead, R. Wollheim, W. Mander, C. 
Keene), political and social philosophy, or philosophy of law (e.g., by P. 
Nicholson, J. Connelly, D. Boucher, A. Vincent, W. Sweet). For that reason, 
most popular interpretations of ES are either preoccupied with topics and 
problems secondary or only marginal to ethics, or discuss the development 
and reception of ideas rather than analyse them. The message of the book is 
often distorted and miVXndeUVWood. ApaUW fUom D. MacNiYen¶V claVVic 
Bradle\¶s Moral Ps\cholog\ (1987), no major systematic interpretation of 
BUadle\¶V moUal philoVoph\ aV a Zhole haV been XndeUWaken, leW alone b\ a 
specialist in moral philosophy. In this light, the ambition of this dissertation is 
to fill in the existing interpretation gap and to contribute to a revaluation and 
reconsideration of Whe VWandaUd inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V eWhical YieZV, hiV 
role and significance for ethics, and connection to present-day ethical 
discussions. The general research objective is to identify the core of ethical 
idealism in the way Bradley has presented it in his ES. For this reason, the 
research is only concerned with the ethical views of Bradley as they are 
formulated in ES, and uses other sources only so long as they help to clarify 
the meaning of ES. The dissertation focuses on the following three major 
topics, which bear the most relevance to present-day philosophical ethics: 
- The account of moral selfhood and the morally good life. BUadle\¶V 
approach to the moral self is especially relevant to the research on 
morality and partiality by S. Wolf (1992); the moral significance of 
personal projects, e.g., by B. Williams (1973) and M. Betzler (2013); the 
connection between plans and personality by M.E. Bratman (1987, 
2000), morality and ideals by P.F. Strawson (1961), C.A.J. Coady 
(2008), and S. Scheffler (1979); as well as personal integrity by 
Ch. Calhoun (1995) and W.J. von Eschenbach (2012).  
- The concept of moral obligation in relation to social duties. Bradley is 
relevant to the research on duties to oneself by M.G. Singer (1963), A. 
Hills (2003), and T. Oakley (2017) because he defines moral duties as 
dXWieV Wo oneVelf. CUiWiciVm of Whe Hegealian idea of ³m\ VWaWion and iWV 
dXWieV´ aW Whe end of EVVa\ V of ES is directly relevant to the research on 
positional duties by A. Simmons (1981). 
- The question of moral motivation. BUadle\¶V YieZV aUe eVpeciall\ 
relevant to the discussion on internalism and the motivational power of 
ideals by D. Velleman (2002), and the role of beliefs and emotive states. 
InWeUeVWing paUallelV can be dUaZn beWZeen BUadle\¶V accoXnW and 
A. HillV¶ (2015) UeVeaUch on ³XliefV´, aV Zell aV T. GendleU¶V (2008a, 
2008b) and U. KUiegel¶V (2012) UeVeaUch on ³aliefV´. ES raises the 
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question of the moral relevance of desire, and is especially relevant to 
the narrative account of desire by T. Airaksinen (2016). 
The examination of these topics has been pursued through five research 
articles, which examine the following research questions:  
- DoeV BUadle\¶V eWhical idealiVm UedXce Whe moUal Wo Whe Vocial VpheUe? DoeV iW 
commit a naturalistic fallacy? (Article I and, to some extent, Article II) 
- DoeV BUadle\¶V eWhical idealiVm Vee Whe peUfoUmance of Whe dXWieV 
peUWaining Wo one¶V VWaWion aV morally obligatory? (Article I) 
- What is the moral significance of self-realisation? (Articles II±IV)  
- WhaW doeV iW mean Wo be a moUall\ good peUVon accoUding Wo BUadle\¶V 
ethical idealism? (Articles I±V) 
- HoZ can Whe moUal UeleYance of deViUe in BUadle\¶V eWhical idealiVm be 
accounted for? (mainly Articles III±IV, also Articles II and V) 
- How does Bradley explain moral motivation? Is he an internalist or 
externalist? (Article V)  
- AUe emoWionV moUall\ UeleYanW accoUding Wo BUadle\¶V eWhical idealiVm? 
(Article V) 
In oUdeU Wo anVZeU WheVe TXeVWionV, BUadle\¶V moUal YieZV aV e[pUeVVed in ES and 
auxiliary writings have to be reconstructed, analysed, and interpreted. Thus, the 
first goal of this dissertation project is the reconstruction of BUadle\¶V accoXnWV of 
concepts that are crucial for the understanding of his moral philosophy. These 
concepts include: moral self, moral obligation, desire, moral judgment, and moral 
motivation. No single, unified exposition of any of these terms as used by Bradley 
can be found. Instead one can find disconnected discussions and scattered remarks 
in different texts. This fact dictates the necessity to re-create and piece together 
BUadle\¶V accoXnW of each concepW.  
The next goal is to analyse those ethical terms that are key to the understanding 
of ES. The analysis incudes several steps. Firstly, I determine concepts and ideas 
that are essential to understanding the analysed ethical concepts; that is to say, 
that help to elicit the intended meaning. For example, the concept of the moral 
self is analysed into the concept of personal projects; moral obligation is 
essentially connected to the idea of being required by the norms governing pre-
institutional relationships; desire is reduced to the identification with an object; 
moral motivation is connected to the idea of the motivational whole, and moral 
judgements are analysed through complex states involving cognitive and non-
cognitive elements. Next, each of the abovementioned ethical concepts is 
differentiated from similar ones. It is shown, for example, that the concept of 
the moral self cannot be reduced to psychological facts about a person (such as 
character, or a set of habits). Moral obligation is distinguished from social 
requirement. The concept of desire is contrasted with the concepts of conation, 
wish, and need. It is shown that Bradley sees moral beliefs as distinct from 
 14 
desire and non-moral beliefs. Finally, the role of these key concepts in the 
context of ES is examined, and their connection to other relevant ethical 
concepts and claims is established. In this manner, the different core aspects of 
Bradle\¶V moUal philoVoph\ aUe connecWed (foU a compUehenViYe V\nWheViV of Whe 
dissertation articles, refer to Section VI). 
The third dissertation goal is to interpret BUadle\¶V moUal philoVoph\. The 
problem with many secondary sources on ES is that they merely retell the book, 
offering no explanation or insight into the meaning of the specific claims and 
concepWV. GiYen Whe obVcXUiW\ of BUadle\¶V We[W, a meUe deVcUipWion of Whe conWenW 
of the book that does not offer more than a re-statement or repetition of the 
original has little added value, and is bound to create further confusion and 
controversy. For this reason, the present dissertation aims at interpretation, 
that is to say, at the construction of understanding rather than at a description 
of BUadle\¶V Yiews.3 The idea is to flesh out the core topics of ES, reveal the 
implicit meaning of obscure concepts, and connect these new ideas with 
WheoUieV Zhich aUe alUead\ knoZn Wo BUadle\¶V UeadeU in oUdeU Wo pUoYide conWe[W 
b\ dUaZing a biggeU picWXUe of BUadle\¶V moUal philoVoph\, and Wo illXVWUaWe Whe 
ideas that are being explained through examples. The intention is to make 
BUadle\¶V ideaV XndeUVWandable and hiV ES more readable, so that contemporary 
ethics can learn from it and debate its meaning. In this dissertation, the 
interpretation is seen as involving two major tasks: a) to explicate the intended 
meaning, implicit ideas, and obscure elements of the text; b) to explain or give 
meaning Wo BUadle\¶V ideaV and WeUmV Zhich aUe YagXe oU Veem Wo be obVcXUe. 
The challenge ofWen iV Wo oYeUcome BUadle\¶V WeUminolog\ when it proves to be 
enigmatic. For example, it is nearly impossible to make sense out of the concept 
of desire if one relies only on the explicit definition given in ES. I suggest the 
inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V idea of deViUe aV Whe idenWificaWion of Whe agent with 
the object as a narrative account of desire, according to which it is a story about 
Whe aWWUacWiYe pUopeUWieV of Whe deViUed objecW. AnoWheU e[ample iV BUadle\¶V 
concept of the moral self. It lacks a definition altogether. Analysing the use of 
the term self in different contexts, I have suggested the interpretation of the 
moral self in two senses. The first is my moral self, which is best understood as 
the personal project of reaching for the moral ideal. The second is the moral self, 
which stands for the moral principle of universalizability. But perhaps the most 
confXVing of all iV Whe phUaVe ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´, Zhich, Zhen looked 
upon with caution, stands for a number of different claims throughout the book. 
I suggest that the most significant of these claims are (depending on the context) 
G.W.F. Hegel¶V WheoU\ of SiWWlichkeiW, and Whe claim WhaW Vocial UeTXiUemenWV aUe 
morally obligatory only when they are justified by the norms of pre-
institutionalised relationships. 
 
3 On the difference between description and explanation see, e.g., J.F. Hanna (1969). 
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The uniqueness of this study consists in its exclusive focus on the key concepts 
of BUadle\¶V moUal pV\cholog\, noUmaWiYe eWhicV, and meWa-ethics, in its 
systematic approach to the reconstruction of the main idea of ES, and in its 
drawing of connections to topics from present-day moral philosophy. This 
helps to achieve a new, analytic interpretation of ES. The dissertation moves 
this under-researched work into the context of contemporary ethics (instead 
of reading it as a dialectical work of continental philosophy²see more in 
Section IV.5) and, by doing so, recovers its significance as a ground-breaking 
early analytic text with implications for moral psychology, ontology, 
epistemology, and normative ethics. It breaks away from the traditional 
reading of ES from the standpoint of political and social philosophy, and 
connects Bradley to topics relevant to present-day philosophical ethics. It 
challenges the long-VWanding idea of idenWif\ing BUadle\¶V eWhicV ZiWh a 
supplemented version of the theory of my station and duties, and argues that 
BUadle\ VaZ Whe goal of moUal life in Whe UealiVaWion of one¶V moUal ideal.  
Three major considerations limit the scope of the dissertation. Firstly, the 
diVVeUWaWion UeconVWUXcWV ZhaW iV VomeWimeV UefeUUed Wo aV Whe ³poViWiYe WheoU\´ 
(after Wollheim, 1962, xiv) of ES. ThiV e[pUeVVion iV XVed Wo UefeU Wo BUadle\¶V 
oZn moUal WheoU\, aV oppoVed Wo Whe WheoUieV WhaW he cUiWiciVeV. BUadle\¶V 
famous and well-researched criticism of rival theories receives lesser attention 
in this thesis. Secondly, the current dissertation study is concerned with moral 
phenomena as distinct from other types of phenomena, such as social, 
political, and religious. This, in turn, delineates the extent to which the text of 
ES iV anal\Ved. BUadle\¶V eWhical views are taken in their own right, apart from 
his political and religious views. The object of study is further limited by the 
fact that ethics is considered as a type of philosophical inquiry distinct from 
metaphysics, political and social philosophy, philosophical anthropology, or 
hiVWoU\ of philoVoph\ and philoVoph\ of Ueligion. AV a UeVXlW, BUadle\¶V moUal 
philosophy is analysed with no connection to his views on these subjects. There 
are several reasons for this choice (see more in Sections IV.1±4.), but the 
pUimaU\ UeaVon foU noW conVideUing hiV meWaph\VicV iV, in bUief, BUadle\¶V oZn 
intention to bracket out metaphysics in ES. We can justifiably conclude that, 
according to ES, the discussion of the ontological status of moral facts does not 
affect moral practice.  
2. How to interpret Ethical Studies  
First and foremost, this dissertation adopts an analytic approach to the text 
of ES, taking the focus away from the traditional methods of the history of 
philosophy, which cannot provide relevant or adequate answers to the 
research questions put forth in Section I. The implication of adopting an 
analytic approach is that the dissertation focuses on the elucidation of the key 
questions of ES, the explication of its main ideas and the connection between 
them, as well as connecting these ideas to ethical problems, rather than tracing 
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the development of ideas and concepts, describing tendencies and putting 
ideaV in hiVWoUical peUVpecWiYe, oU connecWing BUadle\¶V YieZV Wo Vchools of 
philosophy or individual thinkers.4  
Secondly, the dissertation is a systematic analysis of ES, and offers a detailed 
discussion of the key topics necessary for the explanation of the main idea of 
the book. This implies that the research is necessarily selective: not all topics 
touched upon in ES are covered in this dissertation. The analytic method 
employed in this dissertation involves:  
- Explaining and interpreting the key ideas and concepts as well as the 
structure of the main arguments of ES, rather than describing and 
retelling the content of the book; 
- Showing the internal connections between the main ideas, concepts, 
and arguments of ES; 
- Explicating the meaning of the key concepts used by Bradley in ES. This 
task involves, when possible, referring to the relevant concepts from 
BUadle\¶V minoU ZoUkV on eWhicV and pV\cholog\; 
- InWeUpUeWing (oU ³WUanVlaWing´) BUadle\¶V oXWdaWed and confXVing eWhical 
terminology into up-to-date, more understandable philosophical 
language; 
- Clarifying the structure of individual essays and reconstructing the flow 
of arguments. An important part of this work is the proper attribution 
of the various parts of the arguments to Bradley or to the theories he 
cUiWiciVeV, fleVhing oXW BUadle\¶V ³dialogXe´ ZiWh oWheU moUal 
philosophers;  
- UndeUVWanding Whe connecWion beWZeen Whe book¶V eVVa\V and WheiU Uole 
in the overall argument for the book. 
 
4 Aaron Garrett suggested that my approach comes close to what is often called rational 
reconstruction in Whe hiVWoU\ of philoVoph\, ³bXW in a Za\ WhaW doeV noW Veem anachUoniVWic´ 
(on rational reconstruction, see e.g., Rorty 1984, Beany 2013). It was not my intention to use 
this as a framework for my PhD project. I do find myself sharing some of the general 
assumptions and intentions underlying it, provided that what is understood by rational 
reconstruction is an analytic method of working with the text that is characterized by a 
combination of: (a) a conviction that theories, accounts, and arguments do no stop 
contributing to the solution of a philosophical problem just because the philosopher who 
developed them is dead; (b) a belief that the dead philosopher²just like a living one²could 
have had some great ideas, while²just like a living one²could also have got some things 
wrong, e.g. due to his/her cultural context or scientific paradigm; and (c) an intention to 
incorporate these theories, accounts, and arguments into the present-day discussion of the 
same or related problems. Even so, I did not see my dissertation as a history of philosophy 
study, but as a study in philosophical ethics. The intention of this study was to develop a 
certain approach to the interpretation of morality, and to analyse certain moral concepts by 
building on the foundation of research work done before mine (this is not to say that the 
dissertation does not contribute to the history of ethics, but this is to highlight the research 
focus and priorities). Whether this is to be viewed as adopting a new standpoint, or using a 
combination of deferent approaches, is not the key matter. 
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Thirdly, the work on ES started with the deconstruction of the text. 
Deconstruction was required after breaking away from the traditional approach 
to ES, according to which the book has to be read in the order in which it was 
written. This conventional approach has been necessitated by the belief that the 
book was written using the Hegelian dialectical method, and therefore various 
parts of the text can only be properly understood in their context, that is, as a part 
of a specific phase of the development of the argument. As I will show later in this 
Introduction, this assumption is ungrounded (see Section IV.5.), and there is a 
need to break away from the traditional reading of the book. Reading the book as 
if it were based on Hegelian dialectic predisposes the reader for 
misinterpretation. Deconstruction means not reading ES throughout, but 
through the prism of specific problems. This is not a completely new approach. 
For instance, MacNiven (1987) at least partially deconstructs the book and 
reconstructs it around topics he thinks important, when discussing the contents 
of EVVa\ I (on fUee Zill) in UelaWion Wo BUadle\¶V UejecWion of XWiliWaUianiVm (EVVa\ 
III), and when discussing virtue in connection with self-sacrifice. In doing so, 
MacNiven also does not analyse the book in the sequence in which it was written. 
Ne[W, BUadle\¶V eWhical YieZV ZeUe reconstructed. The first step was to identify 
the central ethical problem that ES is dedicated to²What sort of persons are 
we to become?²and find those parts of the book in which Bradley offers the 
solution to this central problem. The second step was to identify the 
supporting concepts and ideas which Bradley uses in order to explain his 
solution, as they appear throughout the book. The reconstruction of ES in the 
abovementioned manner has yielded the following structure. The reading is 
beVW VWaUWed ZiWh EVVa\ II ³Wh\ ShoXld I be MoUal?´, Zhich inWUodXceV Whe 
central ethical problem (What sort of persons are we to become?) and the key 
eWhical concepW of Whe book (Whe moUal Velf). Ne[W comeV EVVa\ VI ³Ideal 
MoUaliW\´, Zherein Bradley offers his own response to this question (we ought 
Wo become ideal VelYeV). AfWeU WhaW comeV EVVa\ I ³The VXlgaU NoWion of 
ReVponVibiliW\´, Zhich e[plainV Zh\ Whe concepW of Whe moUal Velf iV Whe 
coUneUVWone of eWhicV, and EVVa\ VII ³SelfiVhness and Self-VacUifice´, Zhich 
e[plainV Whe deWailV of BUadle\¶V accoXnW of Whe moUal Velf. Onl\ afWeU WhaW come 
the critical Essays III±V, in which Bradley criticises other accounts of the 
moUal Velf. ³ConclXding RemaUkV´ aUe beVW Uead in Whe end, aV Whe\ mark the 
limits of ethics and demarcate morality from religion. It has to be highlighted 
that the proposed method is by no means the only one possible. I, however, 
believe that a reading of ES in the suggested sequence allows for a clearer 
vision of the book¶V goalV and aUgXmenWV. ThiV meWhod haV been WeVWed in a 
coXUVe on BUadle\¶V eWhical idealiVm WaXghW b\ Whe aXWhoU of WhiV WheViV aW Whe 
University of Iceland in 2016 and, according to the received feedback, it proved 
Wo be XVefXl foU Whe VWXdenWV¶ XndeUVWanding of BUadle\¶V idealiVm and WheiU 
ability to connect ES to various up-to-date ethical discussions. 
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Some may object to the idea of breaking the original flow of the book. For 
example, Nicholson (1990) and Mander (2011) write that the essays must be 
read in the same order that they were written. There is a problem with saying 
³mXVW be Uead´ in WhiV caVe. SXUel\, iW iV noW meanW WhaW no one can oU iV alloZed 
to read the book in any other order under no circumstances. More likely, this 
imperative is directed at a researcher or a reader who aims at grasping 
BUadle\¶V oUiginal YiVion. ThiV YiVion iV deUiYed fUom BUadle\¶V oZn ZoUdV fUom 
the introduction to the first edition of ES, WhaW Whe EVVa\V ³aUe Vo faU connecWed 
that, for the most part, they must be read in Whe oUdeU in Zhich Whe\ VWand´ 
(BUadle\ 1962, Yiii). NoWe, hoZeYeU, WZo WhingV. FiUVW, BUadle\ Va\V: ³foU Whe 
moVW paUW´, noW Whe Zhole book. Second, he makeV WhiV UemaUk in Whe 
connecWion Wo hiV cUiWiciVm of leading eWhical WheoUieV. So, WhiV ³moVW paUW´ 
refers to Essays III±V (³PleaVXUe foU PleaVXUe Sake´, ³DXW\ foU DXW\¶V Sake´, 
³M\ SWaWion and IWV DXWieV´), Wo Zhich I do noW objecW. BUadle\ doeV noW Va\ 
WhaW Whe book¶V oUdeU iV UeTXiUed foU Whe coUUecW inWeUpUeWaWion of hiV oZn 
ethical theory. The fXll TXoWe: ³TheVe EVVa\V aUe a cUiWical diVcXVVion of Vome 
leading questions in Ethics, and are so far connected that, for the most part, 
Whe\ mXVW be Uead in Whe oUdeU in Zhich Whe\ VWand´ (BUadle\ 1962, Yiii).  
 
But even if Bradley had said that the entire book should be read in a certain 
order, the question is how we should treat this request. How far should a 
researcher follow the wishes of the author of the texts she is studying? The 
answer comes down to the methodological difference between various fields of 
scientific inquiry, in this case between ethics and the history of philosophy. A 
historian of philosophy, for whom it is important to document the ideas in 
their context, is more predisposed to treat such a request as a requirement. It 
reveals BUadle\¶V oZn YiVion and Whe plan foU Whe conVWUXcWion of Whe meaning 
of the text. In ethics, where it is important to flesh out accounts of certain 
moral concepts alongside the arguments for moral claims, this request sounds 
rather like an advice, which comes from a certain motivation and context and 
which one should follow if doing otherwise would result in a significant loss of 
meaning. The choice of the reading approach is conditioned (not exclusively, 
but first and foremost) by the considerations of the research goals and 
TXeVWionV. The aXWhoU¶V YiVion of Whe plan of Whe book iV impoUWanW, bXW WheUe 
are other considerations when it comes to the reconstruction of ideas. One 
UeaVon iV WhaW Whe aXWhoU¶V plan mighW noW haYe been Whe beVW foU Whe e[poViWion 
of a ceUWain Wopic. The YieZ WhaW one VhoXld XncondiWionall\ folloZ BUadle\¶V 
request just because Bradley was the author of ES is a type of an argument 
from authority, and there is hardly space for such argumentation in the 
contemporary scientific discourse. If Whe inViVWence on folloZing Whe book¶V 
flow comes from the fear of losing some elements of the text which are 
important to determining its meaning, ES is not a case in which this would 
happen. It is my claim that whether we accept the requirement to read the 
book in the order it is written or not is irrelevant to its conclusions on ethical 
matters. There are independent arguments that support them. Breaking away 
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from its original structure, however, helps to elicit the dense net of topics that 
is otherwise overshadowed by misplaced connotations of Hegelian dialectics. 
Therefore, I believe the objection that one must not read ES in a different order 
Whan iW iV ZUiWWen doeV noW VWand in Whe conWe[W of eWhicV. AV faU aV BUadle\¶V ES 
is concerned, it is time to break away from the interpretive curse and its pitfalls 
for the history of philosophy, and to analyse the book conceptually. Note that 
I am talking about the reconstruction of the main idea for research purposes. 
I do not claim that one cannot or is not allowed to read the book in any other 
order than I have suggested. After the book has been reconstructed around the 
core topic of moral personhood, the alternative flow of the argument from the 
first essays to the last becomes apparent: highlighting selfhood as the main 
moral concern (Essay I); demonstrating that self-realisation is the only moral 
goal (Essay II); criticising existing accounts of moral selfhood, i.e. the moral 
goal to be realised (Essays III±V); claiming WhaW one iV Wo UealiVe one¶V ideal self 
(Essay VI); explaining the psychology of moral self-realisation (VII). When 
understood in this way, there is not a problem with reading the book in the 
order it is written.  
 
Lastly, the dissertation employed the hermeneutical circle method 
(Gadamer, 1979): the understanding of the individual parts of the book, as 
well as of certain concepts and ideas, contributes to the grasp of the general 
goal of the book and the direction of its core argument, which in turn 
reshapes the understanding of the various parts of the book and specific ideas 
and concepWV. ThXV, Whe UeconVWUXcWion of BUadle\¶V moUal WheoU\ in ES 
UeTXiUeV a UepeWiWiYe e[planaWoU\ moYemenW fUom Whe book¶V indiYidXal paUWV 
to its overall message and back.  
 
3. Notes on Terminology 
3.1. Idealist ethics, idealistic ethics, or ethical idealism? 
 
IW iV common Wo claVVif\ BUadle\¶V moUal philoVoph\ XndeU idealism. This is, 
however, rather ambiguous. The term idealism is widely used and has multiple 
meanings in different contexts. There is no unity among idealist theories, no 
single idealist doctrine. Mander even defines idealism as a Wittgensteinian 
resemblance concepW: ³WhaW Ze find « aUe man\ diffeUenW poinWV of idenWiW\ 
held common by many different sets of thinkers, which taken all together 
create a knotwork of linkages overlapping and crisscrossing with each other, a 
complex system of similarities in virtue of which a particular set of beliefs 
stands out as densely interconnected, but only sparsely united with others 
oXWVide Whe fold´ (MandeU, 2016, p. 4). ThXV, Zhen deVcUibing BUadle\¶V eWhicV 
as idealism, the question rises: idealism, in what sense?  
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Idealism is mostly understood as a metaphysical doctrine. It is further 
commonly reduced to either one of the two following claims: the ontological 
claim that reality is mind-dependent, or the epistemological claim that our 
knowledge of the world is determined by the structure of the mind itself. 
Idealist ethics (Mander, 2016) is then understood as a set of views commonly 
shared by philosophers who consider themselves metaphysical idealists, i.e. 
ethical views common to most idealists. Despite the fact that Bradley certainly 
is a metaphysical idealist5 (it is less certain, however, which of the two claims 
he accepts), to say that he develops idealist ethics amounts to next to nothing. 
And no wonder: since the definition focuses on the unity of metaphysical 
views, it guarantees no unity on ethical views. There have been many attempts 
Wo caWegoUiVe BUadle\¶V ZoUk. BUadle\ iV ofWen claVVified aV a PlaWonic, a 
Hegelian, or a Kantian. But, then again, he is also close to Hume in some 
respects. Whatever the truth may be, all of these classifications attempt to find 
allieV foU BUadle\¶V meWaph\Vical YieZV, bXW noW hiV eWhicV, Zhich iV Whe maWWeU 
in question. Bradley is certainly not a eudaemonist. It is at least doubtful that 
BUadle\ V\mpaWhiVeV ZiWh Hegel¶V SiWWlichkeiW. He also heavily criticised the 
foUmaliVm of Whe caWegoUical impeUaWiYe. So, ZheUe aUe BUadle\¶V eWhical allieV 
among idealists? 
IW iV naWXUal Wo conVideU BUadle\¶V eWhicV in Whe conWe[W of Anglo-American 
philosophy.6 BUadle\¶V eWhicV iV commonl\ conVideUed together with the ethical 
views of such thinkers as T.H. Green, E. Caird, J.M.E. McTaggart, R.G. 
Collingwood, Bosanquet, Mackenzie. Then again, what unites all these 
thinkers? What makes them idealists? If it is their metaphysical views, then 
some, such as A.C. Ewing, argue that as far as idealist thinkers are concerned, 
³WheiU idealiVm ZaV Vimpl\ iUUeleYanW Wo WheiU eWhical conWenWionV´ (MandeU, 
2016, 15). Mander (2016) offers reasons contrary to this claim, pointing to a 
number of themes common to the ethics of many idealists worldwide (such as 
the fact-value unity; the role of ideals in ethics; the moral self; self-realisation; 
focus of social aspects of morality; holism; rejection of hedonism). It is not my 
task in this dissertation to establish whether there is such a core to idealist 
ethics in general, or specifically to the Anglo-American tradition, nor to 
identify a claim or set of claims that any number of idealists would support. I 
will limit myself to saying that whatever the agreement on ethical issues 
among idealists may be, and even if we accept the similarities of themes (at 
least among Anglo-American thinkers), once we assume a more analytic 
approach to ES, Bradley appears to differ in many of his conclusions.  
 
5 Because ES does not discuss ontological or epistemological questions (see Section IV of this 
Introduction), the metaphysical idealism falls outside the scope of this thesis and therefore is 
not discussed in detail. 
6 For a recent review of idealism and its historical development outside Britain see, e.g., W. 
Sweet (2010). 
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If Ze aUe Wo caWegoUiVe BUadle\¶s ethics, then I suggest that we look again at the 
YeU\ WeUm idealiVm. IW iV pUedominanWl\ XndeUVWood aV a deUiYaWiYe of ³idea´ 
(idea-liVm) aV ³a commitment to the primacy of ideas in any understanding 
of the universe´ (MandeU, 2016, p. 6). Idea iV a fXndamental term in ontology, 
epistemology, and psychology, and there can hardly be only one definition of 
it. Ideas may, for example, refer to:  
- the platonic sense of perfect types (archetypes); the true nature of any 
entity, accessible only by the intellect; 
- conceptual or abstract general rules of thought (Neo-Platonism, Augustin); 
- mental representations (R. Descartes, G.W. Leibniz); 
- special metaphysical entities; the furniture of the world (G. Berkeley); 
- that which gives meaning to words (L. Wittgenstein, R. Rorty, J. Derrida); 
- products of reason alone, i.e. conceptions that transcend the possibility of 
experience (I. Kant); 
- the active drivers of any change in the world or thought (A. Schopenhauer, 
Hegel).  
BXW deVpiWe WheVe diffeUenceV in definiWionV, ³idea´ is always understood as an 
elemenW in cogniWion; hence Whe meWaph\Vical connoWaWionV of ³idealiVm´. IW iV 
ofWen foUgoWWen WhaW idealiVm ma\ alVo come fUom ³ideal´ (ideal-iVm). ³Ideal´ 
is a normative term that is used to refer to a standard, a state of perfection, 
VomeWhing deViUable. And iW iV idealiVm in WhiV laWWeU VenVe WhaW BUadle\¶V moUal 
philosophy belongs to. A commonly used term is idealistic ethics. Frequently, 
the term refers to a theory that defines good (or right) in terms of an ideal 
principle, concepW, oU a VWaWe of affaiUV. BUadle\¶V eWhicV iV idealiVWic in WhiV 
sense. However, when idealistic ethics is defined as such it is insufficient to 
diVWingXiVh BUadle\¶V moUal WheoU\ fUom an\ oWheU moUal WheoU\ WhaW defineV 
its core concepts with reference to an ideal principle; for example, Kantianism 
(universal good will) or utilitarianism (ideal state of affairs when a maximum 
utility of all is achieved). Another meaning of idealistic is associated with the 
idea WhaW in one¶V life one oXghW Wo pXUVXe grand goals that are impossible 
(unconditionally unrealisable) or impractical. In this sense, being idealistic 
has a certain negative overtone, implying that the person is detached from 
UealiW\ and liYeV in an imaginaU\ ZoUld. BUadle\¶V moUal WheoU\ doeV not 
require one to be idealistic in this sense. Even though he says that we can never 
fully realise the moral ideal, it is still realisable to some extent (can be 
approximated) and is fully realisable counterfactually, i.e. under the right 
conditions. So, we can dismiss this meaning as well.  
The WeUm WhaW iV beWWeU VXiWed Wo deVcUibe BUadle\¶V moUal WheoU\ iV WhaW of 
ethical idealism. However, we ought to distinguish it from a kind of 
instrumental ethical idealism proposed by N. Rescher (1987), with its central 
thesis being that ideals, despite being unrealistic and unachievable, have the 
instrumental value of motivating agents to strive for unachievable goals and 
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thus produce better outcomes then they otherwise would. Since Bradley sees 
the moral ideal as a goal in iWVelf, he can haUdl\ be Veen aV embUacing ReVcheU¶V 
position. Bradley develops a version of non-instrumental ethical idealism that 
claims that the goal of a moral life is the realisation of the moral ideal for its 
oZn Vake. BUadle\¶V moUal philosophy is an ethical idealism in this sense.  
 
3.2. The fundamental question of ethics 
Bradley is not so much interested in the problem of the right action; he is 
mostly preoccupied with the question of the morally good personality.7 ES is 
answering the question What sort of person am I to become? The stage is set 
alUead\ in Whe fiUVW eVVa\, ³The VXlgaU NoWion of ReVponVibiliW\«´, Zhen 
Bradley reaches the conclusion that the problem of the freedom of will can only 
be solved when the moral self is properly accounted for. He offers the Kantian 
solution of defining freedom as autonomy or self-determination. The second 
eVVa\, ³Wh\ ShoXld I be MoUal?´, fleVheV oXW Whe pUoblem of moUal peUVonhood 
and states that the rest of the book will be dedicated to answering the question: 
As what am I to realise myself? What sort of self am I to realise as a moral 
being? BUadle\¶V anVZeU Wo WhiV TXeVWion iV finaliVed in EVVa\ VI, ³Ideal 
MoUaliW\´, accoUding Wo Zhich Ze aUe Wo UealiVe an Ideal Velf Zhich iV identified 
with the Moral Ideal. This somewhat enigmatic reply is best interpreted as a 
claim that our moral selves are comprised of commitments that we have in 
virtue of the relationships we have with others. What we ought to be is 
predefined by these commitments and the norms that govern them.  
Does the focus on the question of moral personhood make Bradley a virtue 
eWhiciVW? ThiV iV noW an eaV\ TXeVWion. BUadle\ ZaV Zell familiaU ZiWh AUiVWoWle¶V 
ethics,8 and one can find mentions of virtue in ES. However, virtue never 
became a central topic in the book. Neither did Bradley elaborate on the nature 
of virtue, or mention which character traits count as virtues. As a result, I find 
iW haUd Wo place BUadle\¶V eWhicV ZiWhin Whe YiUWXe WUadiWion. 
 
3.3. Ideals: an account and the normative role 
In ES Bradley does not provide an account or definition of the ideal. As a result, 
it is difficult to say with certainty what his view on the nature of the moral ideal 
iV. One can, hoZeYeU, WU\ Wo UeconVWUXcW Vome elemenWV of BUadle\¶V YieZ in 
 
7 Compare this distinction to L.L. FXlleU¶V (1964) diVWincWion beWZeen Whe moUaliW\ of dXW\ 
(social morality) and the morality of aspiration (requirements that go beyond social morality 
and reflect the needs and desire of a person).  
8 Bradley thoroughly studied Plato and Aristotle as a student at the University of Oxford (e.g. 
³UndeUgUadXaWe EVVa\V [1865-9]´ in Bradley (1999)). 
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general terms. Ideal can be used as a metaphysical concept or a normative one. 
When defining BUadle\¶V moUal philoVoph\ aV eWhical idealiVm, I Uel\ on Whe 
normative meaning of ideal and not the metaphysical one. This does not mean 
that I deny that some of the metaphysical meaningV aUe UeleYanW Wo BUadle\¶V 
understanding of ideal, but that the normative meaning captures most directly 
hiV coUe meVVage WhaW a moUal life conViVWV in liYing Xp Wo one¶V ideal peUVonhood.  
Concerning the normative aspect, for Bradley, the moral ideal, i.e. the ideal we 
are to realise in our lives, is a standard of perfection. In the same sense, we say 
that classical Greek sculpture is the ideal of beauty; it sets the standard for us to 
follow. There are other normative meanings of the word ideal which should not 
be applied Wo BUadle\¶V moUal ideal. FoU e[ample, he doeV noW XVe iW in Whe VenVe 
of Whe beVW opWion, i.e. Whe moVW pUefeUable of Whe aYailable alWeUnaWiYeV (aV in ³iW 
ZoXld be ideal if \oX picked me Xp fUom home´). NeiWheU doeV BUadle\ imply 
that the moral ideal is a perfect representative of its kind, i.e. an existing thing 
that possesses excellent properties (e.g. in this sense, a summer cottage in the 
middle of the forest close to a lake is the ideal vacation place). 
It is important to note that as far as ES is concerned, Bradley accepts the top-
down idealisation strategy. The difference between what I call bottom-up 
strategies and top-down strategies is the direction of idealisation, i.e. the 
difference in the direction of fit of the ideal and real. In the bottom-up 
idealisation strategy, the standard of perfection is to correspond to reality. An 
ideal of X is abstracted from real instances of X. If the nature of X changes, the 
ideal has to change as well. In the top-down idealisation strategy, what is real 
has to correspond to a standard of perfection. An ideal is a rational construct 
which precedes reality. Reality is required to change if the ideal changes. The 
distinction between these two strategies is important in Essays V and VI of ES, 
and is discussed in detail in the first dissertation article.  
As far as the metaphysical aspects of the ideal are concerned, on the basis of 
ES alone iW iV Vafe Wo Va\ WhaW BUadle\¶V moUal ideal mXVW be a concUeWe-
universal. This means that the moral ideal is not an abstract idea or a mere 
product of imagination or reason, but a special type of unity or homogeneity 
of concUeWe elemenWV of one¶V life (such as, for instance, actions, desires, beliefs, 
aspirations, goals, and minor ideals). As a concrete-universal, the moral ideal 
is the multiplicity of all these particular elements, which can all be said to be 
instances or realisations of the same unity. It cannot, therefore, be understood 
or described apart from these instances, which also make up its content. By 
identifying herself with the moral ideal, the moral agent achieves the unity of 
her personality. Two things follow from this. On the one hand, the moral ideal 
as a kind of high and general goal, which, as K. Brownlee (2010*) puts it, are 
conceptions of perfection or excellence that shape the way we think and 
behave. The moral ideal is the ultimate guide of our lives. A useful means of 
distinguishing ideals from goals can be found in Coady, who suggests that 
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idealV aUe like goalV becaXVe Whe\ ³oUienW oXU VWUiYingV, deViUeV, and pUacWical 
UeaVoning´ (Coad\, 2008, p. 51), bXW aUe diffeUenW fUom Whem becaXVe Whe\ 
  
(a) aUe ³moUe compUehenViYe and geneUal´,  
(b) must be esteemed, i.e. assigned a high rank by the person herself,  
(c) have higher persuasive power than goals, and  
(d) are unrealisable.  
 
It is unclear whether Bradley would agree with this distinction, but his 
conception of the moral ideal VeemV Wo embUace all Whe elemenWV of Coad\¶V liVW. 
On the other hand, for Bradley the moral ideal always takes the shape of a 
specific image of an idealised person, a unity of a number of perfect 
chaUacWeUiVWicV. And aV VXch, BUadle\¶V XndeUVWanding of the idea comes close 
Wo WhaW of Velleman¶V, Zho defineV iW aV ³Whe image of anoWheU peUVon, oU a 
cXUUenWl\ XnWUXe image of oneVelf, WhaW one can geW caUUied aZa\ ZiWh enacWing´ 
(Velleman, 2002, p. 100).  
 
It is not easy to answer with certainty how Bradley would deal with the 
question about the reality of the ideal, due to the fact that Bradley refuses to 
discuss any metaphysical questions in ES.9 It is possible, however, to draw 
conclusions about the realisability of the moral ideal. Generally, when saying 
WhaW ³X iV ideal´, one ma\ mean WhaW: 
1) X is a reproducible model. High fashion pieces are of this sort. They 
are being replicated or imitated. 
2) X is impossible; even if the conditions were right, X could not be realised. 
3) X is counterfactually realistic; X is too demanding for realisation 
under present conditions, but X could be realised if the conditions 
were right (the ideal of global responsibility is one such ideal). If the 
counterfactual conditions take place, X can either be fully realised or 
at least realised to some extent. 
I ZoXld aUgXe againVW XndeUVWanding BUadle\¶V moUal ideal aV a UepUodXcible 
model. The universal side of the moral ideal is void of content; it only exists as 
my moral ideal or the ideal of my personhood, and is therefore built from the 
paUWicXlaU elemenWV of one¶V life. BUadle\ iV noW VXggeVWing WhaW WheUe iV one 
desirable way of living that everyone should replicate. Neither does he suggest 
that there are personhood types that we all should imitate. Again, Bradley 
never says that the moral ideal cannot be realised under any circumstances. 
On the contrary, according to ES, the ideal can never be fully realised due to 
 
9 Since Whe deYelopmenW of BUadle\¶V WhoXghW fUom Whe eaUlieU peUiod Wo AR is outside the scope 
of WhiV WheViV, I Zill noW commenW on Whe onWological VWaWXV of idealV in Whe conWe[W of BUadle\¶V 
later metaphysical views. As far as ES is concerned, ideals are thoughts or mental constructs 
that must be taken as real if morality is to exist. 
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the imperfections of human nature. Therefore, one could say that this ideal is 
unrealistic, or too demanding to be realised.  
Philosophers are divided on the question of the moral role of ideals. The fact 
iV WhaW, aV Coad\ pXWV iW, ³[i]dealV haYe had VomeWhing of a bad pUeVV amongVW 
intellectuals in the last third of Whe WZenWieWh cenWXU\´, and man\ conVideU 
Whem ³dangeUoXV and delXVional´ (Coad\, 2008, p. 50). OWheUV, VXch aV Coad\ 
himself, see them as morally significant. Those who feel positive about moral 
ideals still see their role as subordinate to moral rules or principles (e.g., 
Strawson, 1961; Gert, 1998; R.M. Hare as R.N. Berki (1974) interprets him; 
Rescher, 1987). Rescher sees moral ideals as useful tools for the achievement 
of higher goals; Gert contrasts moral rules, which prohibit actions that inflict 
harm or increase its likelihood, with moral ideals, which he sees as positive 
moWiYaWional facWoUV WhaW ³encoXUage one Wo do WhoVe kind of acWionV WhaW leVVen 
Whe amoXnW of haUm VXffeUed´ (GeUW 1998, 91); D. EmmeW (1994) aVVignV Whem 
a regulative role in gXiding oXU pUacWical UeaVon; BUoZnlee claimV WhaW ³Ze can 
have a reason to realise and try to realise genuinely valuable ideals for their 
own sake and noW Vimpl\ foU Whe Vake of achieYing mXndane, UealiVable goalV´ 
(2010, p. 434). It is clear that Bradley, although aware of the danger of some 
ideals being evil, is confident about the central role of the moral ideal and 
believes it must be pursued for its own sake. Moreover, for him, social morality 
is to be criticised from the ideal point of view. It is also clear that, according to 
ES, one has a moral obligation to pursue the moral ideal. In this, Bradley seems 
to agree with philosophers such as Kant, R. Brandt (1963), M. Slote (1983; 
1992), and E. Pybus (1982). As F. Mellema (2010) observes, philosophers are 
divided on this question as well. Some believe it is supererogatory (e.g. 
Frankena, 1963; Beauchamp, 1995), and some, like R. Audi (2005), claim it 
depends on circumstances. 
 
3.4. Self-realisation, self-fulfilment, and self-actualisation 
For Bradley, the morally good life is achieved via self-realisation. The term is 
ambiguous, and this can easily result in misunderstanding. Self-realisation in 
ES iV eVVenWiall\ Whe pXUVXiW of one¶V aVpiUaWionV and gUand deViUeV. IW iV alVo 
VomeWimeV XVed in Whe VenVe of Whe fXlfilmenW of one¶V capaciWieV and WalenWV. 
This is a different meaning, since one may have aspirations and desires which 
do not necessarily coUUeVpond Wo one¶V WalenWV. TheUe iV noW VXfficienW eYidence 
in ES to determine whether Bradley relates self-realisation to talents. 
AccoUding Wo BUadle\, one¶V VWUiYing foU a ceUWain ideal image iV noW done foU 
any further goal: one is not striving in order to become someone, one is 
becoming someone while striving for an ideal. Herein might lie another 
difference with the pursuit of talents, which is often seen as a means to 
becoming an accomplished professional in some area. Self-realisation is also 
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different from self-actualisation. Self-actualisation is a deterministic notion, 
which suggests that the characteristics of the self to be actualised are present 
in Whe Velf fUom Whe VWaUW aV poWenWialiWieV (compaUe Wo Hegel¶V concepW of 
development, where what will be is already contained in the present state as a 
potential). In self-realisation, the self is not predefined. It is not a Hegelian 
Veed WhaW iV alUead\ poWenWiall\ a WUee. One¶V Velf iV being cUeaWed WhUoXghoXW 
one¶V life, aV one pUogUeVVeV WoZaUdV Whe fXlfilmenW of one¶V aVpiUaWionV. Self-
realisation is characterised by freedom of choice or self-determination. 
BUadle\¶V meaning of Velf-realisation is, in fact, close to what A. Gewirth (1998, 
pp. 6-8) describes as self-fulfilment, which  
leaves more Uoom foU cUeaWiYiW\ [«]: in fXlfilling oneVelf one cUeaWeV oneVelf in WhaW 
one cUeaWeV boWh one¶V poZeUV (b\ giYing Whem deWeUminaWe foUm) and one¶V 
deYeloped VWaWeV oU acWiYiWieV. ThiV deYelopmenW iV Vhaped b\ one¶V aVpiUaWionV, 
Zhich help Wo moXld one¶V implicit powers as well as the ends towards which they 
are directed (Gewirth, 1998, p. 7). 
 
3.5. Perfectionism 
BUadle\¶V eWhicV iV a peUfecWioniVW eWhicV.10 We should dismiss at once any 
attempt to understand this in a vulgar sense as a requirement to pursue 
e[cellence in eYeU\ deWail, no maWWeU Whe coVW and UealiVabiliW\. T. HXUka¶V 
narrow sense of perfectionism comes close to what Bradley has in mind when 
claiming that true Morality (for the capital letter cf. ES, 191) is connected to 
our understanding of ³Whe WUXWh of hXman naWXUe´ (BUadle\, 1962, p. 247). 
Compared to perfectionism in the broader sense, Zhich YalXeV ³Vome 
deYelopmenW of capaciWieV´ and ³Vome achieYemenW of e[cellence´ (HXUka, 
1993, p. 4), perfectionism in the narrow sense sees perfection as excellence 
defined by human nature and human good as being essentially related to 
hXman naWXUe. BUadle\¶V UemaUk WhaW all moUal dXWieV aUe dXWieV Wo oneVelf 
(BUadle\, 1962, p. 219) iV aligned ZiWh HXUka¶V claim WhaW peUfecWioniVm aV VXch 
rejects the morality that centres on acts that affect others:  
On the view now dominant among philosophers, morality concerns only acts that affect 
oWheU people. IW WellV XV noW Wo fUXVWUaWe oWheUV¶ deViUeV oU inWeUfeUe ZiWh WheiU fUeedom 
but says nothing about what we or they should choose for ourselves. Perfectionism 
strongly rejects this view. It has an ideal for each human²that she develops her 
nature²and it may criticise her for failing to achieve it (Hurka, 1993, p. 5).  
AV a UeVXlW, ³iWV accepWance of self-regarding duties is a great strength in 
peUfecWioniVm´ (Hurka, 1993, p. 5). This conclusion fits well with the general 
idea of ES, and helps us to understand that, for Bradley, morality is above all 
 
10 BUadle\ (1999) alVo WalkV aboXW peUfecWion in ´On MoUaliW\´, pp. 258-274. 
 27 
a personal project in which we owe our duties not to others but to ourselves 
(i.e. we are the subjects and objects of our duties), and others are beneficiaries; 
that is to say, they benefit from our fulfilment of our duties (for more on duties 
to oneself, see Hills, 2003).  
 
4. Assessing the Assumptions of Previous Research 
A notable feature of past research on Bradle\¶V moUal philoVoph\ iV Whe 
perpetuation of problematic and, in many cases, ungrounded assumptions, 
Zhich haYe miVUepUeVenWed oU diVWoUWed BUadle\¶V YieZV, pUeYenWing Whem 
from being incorporated in a systematic and fruitful way into contemporary 
research on philosophical ethics and moral psychology. This dissertation 
questions and revises the common assumptions in the interpretation of ES, 
the most important of which I will review now.  
 
4.1. BUadle\¶V ³geneUal philoVoph\´ aVVXmpWion 
There is a tendency to treat ES aV a paUW of BUadle\¶V ³geneUal philoVoph\´ oU 
³oYeUall YieZ´, pUeVXmabl\ inclXding hiV AR and Principles of Logic (PL). This 
assumption is problematic because ES was published seven years prior to PL 
and seventeen years prior to AR. ES can be said to belong to an earlier period 
of BUadle\¶V philoVoph\, Zhen hiV meWaph\Vical YieZV had noW \eW foUmed. 
 
4.2. Connection to metaphysics and the Absolute assumption 
Another common belief is that ES must be understood in connection with 
BUadle\¶V meWaph\VicV and Whe concepW of Whe AbVolXWe. ThiV belief iV 
problematic for a number of reasons. To begin with, one needs to clarify the 
reason for this assumed necessity. If the argument underlying this assumption 
is that ES and AR form a soUW of V\VWem of BUadle\¶V philoVoph\, ZheUe paUWV 
explain each other, I have already shown that this does not stand. If a further 
argument is needed, it would make more sense to research the connection 
beWZeen BUadle\¶V YieZV on eWhicV and hiV YieZV on meWaphysics, by focusing 
on the section of AR that contains a part on morality and the moral good. One 
coXld alVo look inWo Whe deYelopmenW of BUadle\¶V eWhical YieZV fUom hiV eaUlieU 
years to his later work (both questions are, however, different research 
questions than the ones posed in the present dissertation). Placing ES in the 
context of AR is methodologically questionable, given that there is no direct 
connection between the two works. 
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If, on the other hand, what is meant is that one must also present BUadle\¶V 
supporting ontological arguments when reconstructing his views on ethical 
issues, there is another problem. First, as F.S.J. CopleVWone Va\V, ³BUadle\¶V 
Ethical Studies iV noW a meWaph\Vical ZoUk´ (CopleVWon, 1966, p. 190). TheUe iV 
no ontological argument to be found in ES. Bradley famously writes in ES:  
How can it be proved that self-realization is the end? There is only one way to do 
WhaW. ThiV iV Wo knoZ ZhaW Ze mean, Zhen Ze Va\ µVelf¶, and µUeal¶, and Ueali]e¶, and 
µend¶ ; and Wo knoZ WhaW iV Wo haYe VomeWhing like a V\VWem of meWaph\Vic, and Wo 
say it would be to exhibit that system. Instead of remarking, then, that we lack 
space to develop our views, let us frankly confess that, properly speaking, we have 
no such views to develop, and therefore we can not prove our thesis. All that we 
can do is partially to explain it, and try to render it plausible. It is a formula, which 
our succeeding Essays will in some way fill up, and which here we shall attempt 
to recommend to the reader beforehand (Bradley, 1962, p. 65).  
There are different ways that this paragraph can be interpreted. I understand 
iW aV inWUodXcing a diVWincWion beWZeen ³pUoYing´ a claim, a W\pe of Whe 
aUgXmenWaWion moUe VXiWable foU WheoUeWical maWWeUV, and ³UendeUing iW 
plaXVible´, a W\pe of aUgXmenWaWion moUe VXiWable foU pUacWical maWWeUV. What 
he iV Va\ing iV in effecW WhaW aV long aV one UeTXiUeV ³a pUoof´ foU an eWhical 
claim (such as that self-UealiVaWion iV Whe goal of one¶V moUal life), dXe Wo iWV 
abstract nature, the proof has to come in the form of a metaphysical 
argument which, in turn, requires a developed systematic view on the nature 
of reality. However, Bradley maintains that he cannot offer that sort of 
aUgXmenW. FoU Whe UeadeU Zho iV noW WhoUoXghl\ familiaU ZiWh BUadle\¶V 
ethics, it may appear puzzling that he goes on developing his views after 
confessing his inability to prove his main claim. It is especially puzzling 
becaXVe, aW leaVW aV faU aV Whe Vpecific claim ³WhaW Velf-Ueali]aWion iV Whe end´ 
is concerned, there are at least two arguments in the same essay: the 
argument for morality being the goal in itself, and the argument from the 
VWUXcWXUe of Whe Zill. The UeaVon foU WhiV iV WhaW, fUom BUadle\¶V poinW of YieZ, 
he did not need to give a proof in the sense that would be expected from him. 
That is to say, he does not think that ethical claims need proof from within a 
metaphysical system. Instead, Bradley offers another sort of argument. What 
sort of argument that might be is a matter for discussion. One possibility is 
that this argument works by demonstration; it explains the claim and makes 
it appealing. In a sense, the entire book is an argument; once you have made 
your journey as a reader, the truth must become obvious to you. This 
distinction between different types of argumentation is in line with the 
distinction Bradley makes between discursive (i.e., non-moral) and non-
discursive (moral) beliefs. Another possibility is that Bradley rejects 
traditional metaphysical argumentation and tries to develop his own method, 
which turns out to be much closer to what we would today call analytic. The 
argument is developed through essays III±VI. It consists of a revision of a 
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number of rival theories of the moral self, the argumentation of which he 
finds problematic in some way. When these theories are found to be 
unsatisfactory, BUadle\¶V oZn WheoU\ iV VXbVWanWiaWed. MoVW likel\, hoZeYeU, 
both interpretations are correct to some extent. Bradley was experimenting 
with philosophical methodology, and his argumentation style incorporates 
different elements. However one looks at it, Bradley apparently believes that 
he can discuss ethical topics without a metaphysical argument, and sets out 
to develop his stance on moral questions without placing them in the context 
of a metaphysical system. I do not see how one could select this approach 
without also believing that ethics is a field of philosophical inquiry in its own 
right, and that the consideration of moral issues does not necessarily require 
a metaphysical inquiry.  
There is yet another potential objection to my approach. One could say that 
metaphysics is relevant in another sense, that the consideration of meta-
ethical questions about the nature of moral properties is an essential part of 
UeconVWUXcWing one¶V moUal philoVoph\. WheWheU oU noW WhiV iV Vo, iV a maWWeU 
of debate. However, Bradley does not discuss meta-ethical questions in ES, at 
least not in the way we understand meta-ethics. This does not, however, mean 
that it is impossible to reconstruct his views on moral ontology, language, 
epistemology, and psychology. It is possible, and it has been to some extent 
done in this dissertation (for example, concerning such questions as the nature 
of moral motivation and judgements). But this is not an easy task, since one 
has to work with bits and pieces of often apparently contradictory sources full 
of non-standardised terminology, often without any definitions. The most 
difficult second-oUdeU moUal TXeVWion in BUadle\¶V caVe iV WhaW of moUal 
ontology. A proper investigation of this topic would require explaining the 
apparent contradiction between AR, where moral properties are considered 
appearances, and ES, where they are treated as if they were real. But this is the 
topic of another research project, which does not fit in the scope of the present 
dissertation. In my interpretation of ES I Uemain faiWhfXl Wo BUadle\¶V deciVion 
to bracket the ontological question, which I understand as a suggestion that 
whatever the ontological status of moral properties may be, for morality to 
exist, we must think about moral properties as if they were real properties of 
acWionV and peUVonV. In VhoUW, I belieYe WhaW BUadle\¶V eWhical YieZ in ES can be 
and should be discussed independently of his AR.  
Finall\, conceUning BUadle\¶V concepW of AbVolXWe, one mXVW be YeU\ caUefXl 
when discussing it in the context of ES, as there is not sufficient evidence in 
the book to conclude that it is relevant to ethical questions. Bradley only 
mentions the term Absolute in passing; he mentions the concept of God,11 e.g., 
in ³ConclXding RemaUkV´, bXW WhiV paUW of Whe We[W discusses religion and not 
ethics per se. BUadle\ Va\V, foU e[ample: ³Of coXUVe if Ueligion, and moUe 
 
11 For Bradley, the concept of God is different from the concept of Absolute (cf, e.g., Vincent, 
2000, p. 104). 
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particularly Christianity be brought in, the answer must be different. The ideal 
heUe iV a XniYeUVal, becaXVe iW iV God¶V Zill, and becaXVe iW WheUefoUe iV Whe Zill 
of an organic unity, present though unseen, which is the one life of its many 
members, which is real in them, and in which they are real ; and in which 
through faith for them, and for God we do not know how, the bad self is unreal. 
But all this lies beyond morality : my mere moral consciousness knows 
nothing whatever about it [the cursive is mine²D.B.]´ (BUadle\, 1962, p. 231). 
And again, I do not claim that the concepts of Absolute and God are not 
impoUWanW foU BUadle\¶V meWaph\VicV oU hiV YieZV on Ueligion. I onl\ Va\ WhaW 
they are not relevant to purely ethical matters.  
 
4.3. Religious ethics assumption  
This thesis breaks away from the belief that in ES moral questions cannot be 
considered apart from religious questions. Bradley finishes his ES with a brief 
conVideUaWion of UeligioXV conVcioXVneVV, Va\ing WhaW ³[m]oUaliW\ iVVXeV in 
Ueligion´ (BUadle\, 1962, p. 314). ThiV ma\ poinW Wo Whe conclXVion WhaW BUadle\, 
in some sense, identifies moral and religious spheres. There are, however, 
reasons to believe that this is a problematic conclusion. Bradley only discusses 
Ueligion in Whe chapWeU called ³ConclXding RemaUkV´, placing iW oXWVide Whe 
main body of the book. This shows that the discussion of religion lies beyond 
the discussion of morality as VXch: ³And heUe Ze VhoXld cloVe WheVe EVVa\V, 
Vince heUe Ze go be\ond moUaliW\´ (BUadle\, 1962, p. 313). TheUe iV no VoXnd 
justification for equating moral with religious spheres in ES. 
 
4.4. Social morality assumption  
Many secondary sources start with the aVVXmpWion WhaW BUadle\¶V moUal 
philosophy in ES cannot be understood apart from questions of social and 
political philosophy. This assumption springs from the conviction that 
BUadle\¶V eWhical WheoU\ iV an XpdaWed YeUVion of Hegel¶V Vocial moUaliW\, and 
fUom Whe peUViVWing belief WhaW BUadle\ idenWifieV Whe moUal Velf ZiWh one¶V 
station, and moral obligation with social requirements. This approach 
oYeUlookV BUadle\¶V aUgXmenW againVW Whe boWWom-up identification of the real 
and the ideal, and is criticised in Article I. It is taken for granted in this 
dissertation that Bradley separated the moral from the political and social 
spheres (see also T. IUZin, Zho claimV WhaW ³[i]n conWUaVW Wo Hegel, GUeen and 
Bradley treat ethics in its own right, not as a part of political theory or cultural 
hiVWoU\´ (IUZin, 2009, p. 536)).  
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4.5. Hegelian dialectic assumption: why the dialectical interpretation of 
Ethical Studies does not work  
 
This thesis challenges the common belief that Bradley uses Hegelian dialectic 
as the main argumentative method in ES. This assumption most likely 
oUiginaWeV fUom Wollheim¶V inWUodXcWion Wo Whe Vecond ediWion of Whe book, and 
has persisted ever since. Wollheim himself does not prove his claim, and as a 
result it is difficult to know with certainty what he had in mind. I argue that 
the claim that Bradley uses Hegelian dialectic in ES does not stand serious 
scrutiny. I rather see his method as proto-analytic.  
In his introduction to the 1962 reprint of the second edition of ES, Wollheim 
defineV BUadle\¶V meWhod aV dialecWical²this opinion has become widespread 
among scholars of British Idealism. Wollheim writes:  
It is extremely important that the principle upon which the various essays have 
been put together should be properly appreciated. For Ethical Studies is 
essentially dialectical in its structure. Hegelian in many of its ideas, it is to an 
even greater extent Hegelian in its method, in the way in which it works its way 
forwards through different and conflicting theories (Wollheim, 1962, pp. xiv±xv; 
see also Wollheim, 1969, p. 229). 
TheUe iV a good UeaVon behind WhiV inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V meWhod²the 
desire to clear Bradley from the accusation of traditionalism and show that ES 
mXVW be Uead fXUWheU Whan Xp Wo EVVa\ V, ³M\ SWaWion and IWV DXWieV´ 
(hereafter²MSID). HoZeYeU, afWeU H. SidgZick¶V UeYieZ (1876) and RoVV¶ 
edition of ES, which omitted Essays I, VI, and VII (Bradley, 1951), the 
identification of BUadle\¶V eWhicV ZiWh Whe WheoU\ of M\ SWaWion and IWV DXWieV 
became a commonplace. The good WhaW Wollheim¶V claim doeV iV WhaW iW 
motivates the reader not to stop at Essay V, and to expect that there is more to 
BUadle\¶V eWhicV Whan MSID. The doZnVide of this claim, however, is that it is 
too far-fetched. The bad that it does is that it blinds the reader to the main 
topics of ES, its key message, and keeps her confused as to the relation of its 
various arguments as well as to the role of the final chapter, ³Ideal MoUaliW\´. 
As a result, the reader tends to overemphasise the role of social morality in 
BUadle\¶V eWhicV and miVaWWUibXWe Vome of hiV cenWUal aUgXmenWV. 
There is however an ambiguity in the claim that ES is dialectical in structure. 
There is no single definition of dialectic method (see more Blackburn, 1994). 
³DialecWic´ ma\ be XVed in a Zide and a Vpecific VenVe. In a wide sense, as 
defined b\ S. BlackbXUn, iW UefeUV Wo Whe ³pUoceVV of UeaVoning Wo obWain WUXWh 
and knoZledge on an\ Wopic´ (BlackbXUn, 1994, p. 104). ³DialecWic´ comeV fUom 
the Ancient Greek expression įǈĮǊİǉĲǈǉǀ Ĳƿǒǌǆ Zhich meanV ³Whe aUW of 
conYeUVaWion´. In a specific sense, it refers to a particular type of reasoning. 
There are, for example: 
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- Zeno of Elea¶s dialecWic, which amoXnWV Wo UefXWing Whe opponenW¶V 
hypotheses by drawing unacceptable consequences from these hypotheses; 
- SophisWs¶ dialecWic, which is used to manipulate the truth and win an 
argument;  
- Socratic dialectic, or the art of searching for truth, involving cross-
e[aminaWion WhaW UefXWeV Whe opponenW¶V h\poWheViV b\ leading him Wo face 
its contradictory consequences when answering a series of questions; 
- Aristotelian dialectic, which is opposed to the method of 
demonstration. While demonstration moves from premises that are 
true in themselves to conclusions that necessarily follow from them, 
dialectic reasoning is based on premises that are accepted either by 
everyone, or the majority, or by philosophers, and proceeds to 
conclusions deductively (cf. e.g. Hamlyn, 1990); 
- Kantian dialectic, which is concerned with exposing the illusion of 
transcendental judgements, that is to say, judgements about things 
beyond experience; 
- Hegelian dialectic, or universal law of reasoning and nature, consisting 
of a way of overcoming contradictions between a thesis (concept or 
phenomenon) and opposite (sometimes referred to as anti-thesis) by 
the means of synthesis (higher unity) that better approximates truth. 
The synthesised view, in turn, is taken as a thesis, considered in 
opposition to the contradictory view, and the reasoning is moved to the 
higher level by reaching the truth of both in a new synthesis. 
The saying that ES is dialectical in structure could imply any of these 
meanings. Often, however, this claim translates to one of the following: 
- A general claim WhaW BUadle\¶V meWhod of UeaVoning in ES is dialectical, 
that is to say that Bradley uses some type of dialectic method to support 
his core claims. NicholVon hinWV aW WhiV conclXVion: ³BUadle\¶V dialecWic 
iV in facW VimpleU Whan Hegel¶V WhoXgh plainl\ deUiYed fUom iW´ 
(NicholVon, 1990, p. 9). In conWUaVW, E. CaiUd belieYeV WhaW BUadle\¶V 
dialectic is rather of a Socratic nature.  
- A specific claim that Bradley utilises Hegelian-style dialectics. For 
e[ample, D. BUink claimV WhaW BUadle\¶V eWhicV iV ³dialecWical in Whe 
specifically Hegelian sense of being organized around an intellectual 
progress through thesis-antithesis-V\nWheViV´ (BUink, 2007, p. 111). A 
similar view is expressed by interpreters such as Wollheim (1962, 
1969), Nicholson (1990), and Mander (2011). 
I Vee no pUoblem in claiming WhaW BUadle\¶V meWhod iV dialecWical in Whe geneUal 
sense. As most philosophers would do, Bradley builds his argument via 
examining existing theories and refuting claims he finds wrong: he is 
³conYeUVing´ ZiWh hiV opponenWV. IW iV pUoblemaWic, hoZeYeU, Wo Va\ WhaW 
Bradley uses the specific method of argumentation developed by Hegel. There 
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are at least two reasons to deny this. First, Bradley has never called his method 
Hegelian dialectic, nor has he described the method of ES in a way that may 
lead a reader to interpret it as such. Moreover, there is a good reason why he 
did not. In his AR, Bradley openly denounces any conscious connection to 
Hegel: 
I feaU WhaW, Wo aYoid « miVXndeUVWandingV, I mXVW Va\ VomeWhing aV Wo ZhaW iV 
called ³HegelianiVm.´ FoU Hegel himVelf, aVVXUedl\ I Whink him a gUeaW 
philosopher; but I never could have called myself as Hegelian, partly because I 
cannot say that I have mastered his main principle, or at least a part of that 
principle. I have no wish to conceal how much I owe to his writings; but I will 
leave it to those who can judge better than myself, to the limits within which I 
have followed him (Bradley, 1883/1950, p. x). 12  
Second, the claim that the structure of ES is dialectical in the Hegelian sense 
doeV noW VWand VcUXWin\. BUadle\¶V aUgXmenWV aUe e[pUeVVed in VeYen eVVa\V 
and, aUgXabl\, in Whe ³ConclXding RemaUkV´, Zhich WogeWheU comprise the ES. 
When the succession of the essays is analysed, it does not support the 
Hegelian-style dialectic interpretation.  
Note, for example, how Wollheim specifies his claim and describes the 
mechanism involved in the dialectical method of ES:  
It iV BUadle\¶V WechniTXe Wo VWaUW ZiWh one paUWicXlaU YieZ of moUaliW\, Wo e[amine 
its merits and its defects, and this leads him on to another view of morality which, 
while retaining as far as possible the merits of the original view, will be free of its 
defects : this view in turn shows itself not to be without error, and so the process 
of correction and refinement goes on indefinitely. That this is the principle upon 
which Ethical Studies iV ZUiWWen haV VomeWimeV been oYeUlooked b\ cUiWicV« 
(Wollheim, 1962, p. xv).  
But, described as such, this is not Hegelian dialectic at all. The nature of 
Hegelian dialectic is a matter for separate research. I cannot be expected to carry 
out this research here, as this is not a dissertation on Hegel. What matters for 
the present goal is that as a method of reasoning, his dialectic is essentially 
based on the internal transformation (sometimes called progress or 
development) of a concept according to a certain principle. This principle, from 
 
12 There is yet another parameter to consider, from the point of view of the history of 
philoVoph\: if one callV BUadle\¶V dialecWic Hegelian, one alVo needV Wo e[plain ZhaW 
Hegelianism and dialectics meant for Victorian thinkers. There is a significant discrepancy 
between our understanding of these terms and that of BUadle\¶V conWempoUaUieV. ReVWUicWed 
by the topic of my thesis, I cannot go into any detail on this question here. However, it is worth 
noting that Hegel was introduced to British readers shortly prior to the writing of ES, and it is 
at least questionable hoZ Zell Hegel¶V meWhod ZaV inWeUpUeWed aW Whe Wime. The most 
inflXenWial VWXd\ of Hegel aW WhaW poinW ZaV J.H. SWiUling¶V enoUmoXV ³The SecUeW of Hegel´ 
(1865), which was reprinted several times but, as is commonly known, never actually revealed 
Hegel¶V VecUeW.  
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a formal point of view, is essentially²what I will call here²a succession of 
triads. There are many ways to interpret these triads and the essence of their 
VXcceVVion. SomeWimeV iW iV deVcUibed XVing Hegel¶V oZn ZoUdV, aV in Whe 
movement of the spirit from the state in-itself (naïve unity) to for-itself 
(alienation or reflection) and finally in-and-for-itself (re-unification with itself 
in achieved knowledge of itself). In other contexts, the triad succession is 
described as consisting of an assertion (commonly called thesis), its negation 
(or antithesis), and the overcoming of the tension between the two in a new 
assertion (synthesis). This succession of triads is ever-present in all his major 
works, including the Phenomenology of Spirit (1977) and Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right (1991). It is especially clearly presented in the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline (2010). The classic 
example of his method is the first movement of the spirit in the Science of Logic: 
it starts with the most elementary concept of being, proceeds to its negation, 
non-being, and overcomes their contradiction in the higher level concept that 
contains the truth of being and non-being, namely the concept of becoming. The 
process continues in steps of triads till the end of the book, when the state of 
Absolute Spirit is achieved. There are researchers who find the interpretation of 
Hegel¶V dialecWic in WeUmV of WheViV-antithesis-synthesis somewhat simplistic. 
The motivation behind this is the desire to focus on that aspect of the method 
that examines a view, reveals its contradiction, examines this opposite view, and 
resolves the contradiction in a new view that comes closer to the truth. I do not 
think that the properly understood thesis-antithesis-synthesis paradigm omits 
any of the implications of the latter interpretation. Thus, in the end, it is just a 
matter of choice which terminology to use. What matters is that the dialectical 
movement is constituted by a certain structured progression of thought, and 
that it happens in threefold steps.  
If BUadle\¶V meWhod in ES were dialectic of the Hegelian style, we would expect 
him Wo adopW Whe eVVenWial elemenWV of Hegel¶V meWhod, and WhaW iV Whe 
succession of the triads. More specifically, in the first essay we would expect 
Bradley to describe a certain claim or point of view which could be seen as 
analogoXV Wo Hegel¶V WheViV. Then, in Whe Vecond eVVa\ Ze ZoXld e[pecW him Wo 
negaWe WhiV claim oU poinW of YieZ, analogoXV Wo Hegel¶V anWiWheViV. FXUWheU, Ze 
would expect the third essay to overcome the tension between the first two 
essays and come to a claim or point of view that plays the role of the synthesis. 
Next, this last claim would be taken as a new thesis in Essay IV, negated in Essay 
V, and developed into a new synthesis in Essay VI. And, finally, to be analysed 
aV a WheViV in EVVa\ VII and negaWed in ³ConclXding RemaUkV´. To compleWe Whe 
dialectic movement, I am afraid, Bradley must have written one more Essay.  
What instead happens throughout the book is the following. In the first essay, 
³The VXlgaU NoWion of ReVponVibiliW\ in ConnecWion ZiWh Whe TheoUieV of FUee-
Zill and NeceVViW\´, BUadle\ inWUodXceV Whe concepW of Whe moUal Velf and 
diVcXVVeV iWV connecWion ZiWh Whe fUeedom of Zill. BUadle\¶V goal iV Wo VhoZ WhaW 
 35 
the concept of the self, without which one cannot make sense of morality and 
moral life, presupposes the concept of freedom of will as autonomy or self-
determination. Those theories that claim the will is free in the sense that it is 
not determined by anything, and those that deny freedom of will, result in 
den\ing Whe moUal Velf. The Vecond eVVa\, ³Wh\ ShoXld I be MoUal?´, VWaWeV 
that the most important ethical question is about the kind of self that one 
should realise in her moral life²WhiV, Va\V BUadle\, ³iV Whe question which to 
Whe end of WhiV YolXme Ze Vhall find oXUVelYeV engaged on´ (BUadle\, 1962, p. 
69). This is so, the essay argues, because there is no exterior motive to being 
moral; the moral end is the end itself. Here, Bradley introduces the concept of 
self-realisation, and briefly and preliminary sketches his account of the moral 
Velf. The WhiUd eVVa\, ³PleaVXUe of PleaVXUe¶V Sake´, diVcXVVeV and UejecWV Whe 
hedonistic view of the moral self which is reduced to a sequence of pleasurable 
feelings. The foXUWh eVVa\, ³DXW\ foU DXW\¶V Sake´, diVcXVVeV and UejecWV Whe 
Kantian-style interpretation of the moral self, which is reduced to a formal 
principle of non-conWUadicWion. The fifWh eVVa\, ³M\ SWaWion and IWV DXWieV´, 
discusses and rejects the Hegelian-sW\le YieZ of Whe moUal Velf, UedXced Wo one¶V 
Vocial UoleV. In Whe Vi[Wh eVVa\, ³Ideal MoUaliW\´, BUadle\ inWUodXceV hiV oZn 
view of the moral self, which he calls the ideal self, and discusses the realisation 
of the self, which is identified with the moral ideal and the approximate nature 
of this realisation. The final essay looks more closely at the idea of the moral 
self and the mechanism that drives moral self-realisation, desire, motives, and 
good and bad selves; it shows that the process of moral self-realisation has 
both egoistic (because it is always something that I do to myself) and self-
sacrificial (because in order to realise myself as a unified whole, I need to give 
up certain aspects of myself) elements.  
There is no dialectic development from the first to the last chapter. There is an 
introduction of the topic of the moral self (Essay I), its preliminary analyses 
(Essay II), a review and criticism of the existing views on the moral self (Essays 
III±V), the formulation of a new theory of the moral self (Essay VI), and a 
consideration of the remaining questions concerning the moral self (Essay 
VII). ³ConclXding RemaUkV´ do jXVW WhaW²conclude the discussion of the moral 
self by defining the limits of ethics in the proper sense and distinguishing it 
from religious studies.  
Thus, Hegelian dialectic cannot be found in the structure of the book as a 
whole. So, where is it? Does it start after Bradley has introduced the concept 
of self-realisation and turned to criticising the rival theories? If so, then it 
beginV in EVVa\ III, ³PleaVXUe foU PleaVXUe¶V Sake´, bXW When ZheUe doeV iW end? 
DoeV iW end in EVVa\ V, ³M\ SWaWion and IWV DXWieV´, Zhich in VXch a Ueading 
synthesises the hedonistic and Kantian-style accounts of the moral self? Or 
doeV iW end in EVVa\ VI, ³Ideal MoUaliW\´? In Whe laVW caVe, ³Ideal MoUaliW\´ iV a 
synthesis of which theories? The dialectic flow apparently breaks in this 
chapter. Rather than developing the concept of the moral self, Bradley, as it is 
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VomeWimeV aUgXed, jXVW ³addV´ Vome elemenWV Wo iW. DoeV WhiV mean WhaW 
Bradley only uses Hegelian dialectic for three chapters? Why does he break the 
dialecWic Zhen inWUodXcing hiV ³Ideal MoUaliW\´?  
The proponents of the Hegelian reading also often refeU Wo ³ConclXding 
RemaUkV´, Zhich Veemingl\ poinWV Wo a pUogUeVVion of eWhicV Wo Ueligion akin Wo 
the Hegelian move in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is true that Bradley draws 
a line beWZeen eWhicV and Ueligion in ³ConclXding RemaUkV´. IW iV noW WUXe, 
however, that there is a dialectic development involved. Unless the proponents of 
the Hegelian reading can provide a satisfactory response to these questions, or 
explain which concept is being developed from the first till the last chapter by the 
means of the Hegelian triad method, I think we are justified in ruling out the idea 
WhaW BUadle\¶V ES is Hegelian in its dialectic method.  
Given the above considerations, I do not find convincing the interpretation of 
BUadle\¶V meWhod aV WhaW of Hegel. The Hegelian elements in the structure of 
the arguments are few and shallow in application, without an insight into the 
dialecWic meWhod aV Hegel XVed iW; WheVe aUe in Whe beVW caVe ³TXaVi-dialecWic´ 
oU ³Hegelian-VW\le´ elemenWV.13 And even so, I am not convinced that an 
interpretation of ES gainV an\Whing fUom VXch labelling. If BUadle\¶V meWhod in 
ES is dialectic in any sense, then, as Caird said, it is Socratic, as he makes the 
reader aware of the implicit assumptions the theories he discusses are based 
upon (Caird, 2004, p. 18). I ZoXld UaWheU be inclined, hoZeYeU, Wo call BUadle\¶V 
method proto-analytic or precursory to what later would become the analytic 
method of writing philosophical texts. The main message of the book, as well 
as the connection between its various arguments, become much clearer if we 
regard it as such. I am not alone in this belief. For example, Copleston was 
aVWoniVhed b\ Whe appaUenWl\ anal\Wic feaWXUeV in BUadle\¶V aUgXmenWV: ³[O]n 
reading the first essay one may receive an impression that the ZUiWeU¶V line of 
thought has more affinity with the modern analytic movement than with what 
ZoXld naWXUall\ be e[pecWed fUom a meWaph\Vical idealiVW´ (CopleVWon, 1966, p. 
190). For obvious reasons, I cannot to any significant degree explore this 
claim, for it would require a comparative research on the methodologies of 
metaphysical idealism and analytic philosophy. I will only briefly note that 
philosophers such as Kant and Hegel aim at the construction of a system of 
knowledge using such abstract methods of reasoning as transcendental 
inquiry. For this approach, it is essential to first lay down logical principles on 
the basis of which the explanation of any phenomena (including the moral) as 
Zell aV Whe being iWVelf iV conVWUXcWed. BUadle\¶V appUoach in ES and his 
psychological articles is very different. He focuses on the meaning of moral 
 
13 Note that this comment concerns only the method of ES. I do not discuss here the extent of 
Hegel¶V inflXence on BUadle\¶V eWhicV. BUadle\ fliUWV ZiWh Hegel¶V VW\le and boUUoZV Vome of 
Hegel¶V concepWV, VXch aV WhaW of Whe concUeWe universal whole and the idea of the true infinite. 
But the extent of this influence is a matter for separate research and falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
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concepts as they appear to the moral agents, on the moral language and 
intuitions. It is not a fully fleshed philosophy of the moral language, but it is 
the beginning of it. He analyses desire, conation, wish, needs, and will, and 
explores emotions, moral motivation, beliefs, and the moral self. This is not 
yet a fully fleshed moral psychology, but it is the beginning of it. Bradley raises 
questions about the moral role of personal projects and aspirations, about 
moral identity, moral responsibility, the moral importance of self-realisation, 
and perfection. He struggles to find new terminology and ways to explain these 
concepts and ideas, while separating moral obligation from the social 
UeTXiUemenWV of ³m\ VWaWion´, Zhen defining deViUe aV an idenWificaWion with 
an object and the action as an utterance of the will. These are often clumsy and 
obscure words, but here lies the beginning of the analytic method.  
 
5. PUeYiRXV ReVeaUch RQ BUadle\¶V MRUal PhilRVRSh\  
5.1. BUadle\¶V oZn ZoUkV  
ES iV BUadle\¶V main ZoUk on eWhicV. IW coYeUV a Zide Uange of WopicV UeleYanW 
to moral philosophy, such as freedom of will, the justification of morality, 
duties and obligation, and moral ideals, but its main focus is on questions 
of moral psychology, such as those of moral motivation and the moral self. 
In addition to developing his own moral theory, Bradley offers criticism of 
the major moral theories of his time: consequentialism, hedonism, 
Kantianism, and Hegelianism. ES iV Whe main VoXUce on BUadle\¶V ethics, 
and is thus the key source for this thesis. There are two editions of ES. 
Bradley did not live long enough to see the second edition published. He 
was, however, preparing book revisions. The text has never been re-written, 
but his comments are incorporated as notes in the second edition, which 
was published after his death. This dissertation uses the second edition, 
which is most commonly referred to by specialists on the topic.  
BUadle\¶V poViWionV on a nXmbeU of TXeVWionV in moUal philoVoph\, aV Ze ll 
as his terminology and arguments, were still developing when he wrote ES. 
For this reason, it helps to supplement the analysis of ES with a series of 
psychological articles published by Bradley in Mind, and with his previously 
unpublished minor writings on ethics and psychology. As D. Crossley (1989, 
p. 59) notes, a better understanding of ES can be obWained WhUoXgh BUadle\¶V 
later psychological articles, which develop ideas that were only briefly 
introduced in the book. Most interesting for ethicists is the reprint of 
BUadle\¶V aUWicleV WiWled Collected Essays (1935/1969), which includes the 
folloZing ZoUkV anal\Ved in WhiV WheViV: ³On PleaVXUe, DeViUe, and VoliWion´, 
alongVide Whe VeUieV of pXblicaWionV ³The DefiniWion of Will (I±III)´, ZheUe 
Bradley explains will as an identification with an idea that tends to realise 
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itself, talks about motivation, discusses the concept of desire and its relation 
Wo conaWion, ZiVh, and needV, pleaVXUe, and pain; ³Some RemaUkV of 
ConaWion´, Zhich helpV claUif\ Whe diVWinction between desire and conation; 
³Can a Man Sin againVW KnoZledge´, diVcXVVing moUal moWiYaWion; ³On Whe 
TUeaWmenW of Se[Xal DeWail in LiWeUaWXUe´, Zhich aidV in Whe XndeUVWanding 
of BUadle\¶V accoXnW of deViUe; and ³On MenWal ConflicW and ImpXWaWion´, 
Zhich diVcXVVeV deViUeV WhaW UepUeVenW Whe main inWeUeVWV of one¶V life, 
conflicting desires, and personal identity. The volume also includes articles 
discussing sympathy and interest, acting from malevolent motives, self-
sacrifice, punishment, psychological phenomenalism, and hedonism. 
AnoWheU collecWion of BUadle\¶V aUWicleV iV Essays on Truth and Reality 
(1914), which, even though not directly relevant to the discussion of ethical 
questions, is nonetheless useful, inter alia, because of the following papers: 
³FaiWh´, Zhich VkeWcheV BUadle\¶V accoXnW of faiWh aV a foUm of belief; ³On 
TUXWh and PUacWice´, Zhich giYeV inVighWV inWo Whe diffeUence beWZeen 
pUacWical and WheoUeWical UeaVoning; and ³On oXU KnoZledge of ImmediaWe 
E[peUience´, ³A DiVcXVVion of Vome Problems in Connection with Mr. 
RXVVell¶V DocWUine´, and ³On MemoU\ and JXdgemenW´, WhaW help Wo 
UeconVWUXcW BUadle\¶V YieZV on emoWionV.  
The Collected Works of F.H. Bradley (1999) is invaluable, because it includes 
previously unpublished works by Bradley, such as the draft of ES and his notes 
on various topics in moral philosophy and psychology. For the research on 
moUal TXeVWionV, Whe folloZing aUe eVpeciall\ inVighWfXl: ³NoWeV WoZaUdV 
Ethical Studies [c. 1874±1875]´ (Vol. I), ³On MoUaliW\ [1877 oU 1878]´ (Vol. I); 
³MS BK Z: Chiefl\ on PV\chological TopicV [c. 1893±1902]´ (Vol. II); ³MS BK 
W: The Final Commonplace Book [1915±1924] (Vol. III)´, aV Zell aV Whe liVW of 
cited works (Vol. III). Lastly, AR conWainV VecWion ³XXV. GoodneVV´, Zhich 
discusses questions of morality. This, of course, is useful for those 
researchers who wish to examine the ethics of later Bradley in the context 
of his metaphysical views. AR alVo inclXdeV BUadle\¶V meWaph\Vical accoXnW 
of the self, which is useful if one aims to make a comparison between his 
metaphysical and moral accounts of the self. 
 
5.2. Secondary sources  
DeVpiWe Whe YaVW liWeUaWXUe on BUadle\¶V meWaph\VicV and logic, WheUe aUe 
UemaUkabl\ feZ conWempoUaU\ VoXUceV on BUadle\¶V eWhicV. One poVVible 
reason for this is, of course, that idealist ethics and ethical idealism have long 
been out of fashion. Another UeaVon iV WhaW BUadle\¶V eWhicV iV ofWen eiWheU 
reduced to, or seen as inseparable from, his political and social philosophy. 
The latter approach inhibits the analysis of uniquely moral problems, 
concepts, and arguments. Since this thesis approached the interpretation of 
 39 
ES through the prism of certain topics, in what follows I will review the 
secondary sources that are useful for research specifically on: the moral self, 
desire, moral motivation, moral judgments, feeling and emotions, my station 
and its duties, and moral obligation. For those interested in secondary 
liWeUaWXUe on oWheU WopicV in BUadle\¶V philoVoph\, iW iV Uecommended Wo VWaUW 
with R. Ingardia (1991),14 which contains a comprehensive bibliography on 
Bradley, including his moral philosophy.15 
 
The moral self 
Commentators (e.g., Bell, 1984; Wright, 1984, Brink, 2007; Milne, 1962; 
Hudson, 1980; Lewis, 1969; Copleston, 1966; Sorley, 1920; MacIntyre, 1998; 
O¶ConnoU, 1964; MXiUhead, 1932; SidgZick, 1954) UaUel\ Vee a need Wo 
conceptualise the moral self. The importance of the concept of the moral self 
is often downplayed or ignored. This presents a serious problem for the 
interpretation of ES because, as is demonstrated in the second dissertation 
article, the entire book is centred around the topic of the moral self and self-
realisation (for similar interpretations see, e.g., Irwin, 2009; Keene, 1970). 
Another common problem is that commentators (e.g., Sprigge, 1984; Vander 
Veer, 1970; Stanley, 1996; Wollheim, 1969; Wilson, 1999; Keene, 1970; 
Nicholson, 1990; Lewis, 1969) fail to sufficiently distinguish between the 
metaphysical account of the self that Bradley develops in his AR and his moral 
account of the self, which is found in ES. Bradley treats the concept of the self 
differently in ES than in AR. The two accounts are independent, and one 
cannot be used as a substitute for the other. My interpretation of the moral self 
in ES stays faithful Wo BUadle\¶V deciVion Wo bUackeW oXW Whe meWaph\Vical 
question, which I generally understand as a suggestion that whatever the 
ontological status of moral properties may be, for morality to exist, we must 
think as if the moral properties were real properties of actions and persons. An 
aWWempW Wo appl\ BUadle\¶V meWaph\Vical concepW of Whe Velf Wo hiV ES 
immediately runs into a problem. From the metaphysical standpoint, the self 
 
14 One should be cautious about misprints in the book. 
15 In the Nordic region, in contrast to German Idealism (esp. Hegel), which enjoyed academic 
interest, British Idealism was not so popular. There has not been much research done on 
BUadle\¶V eWhicV in Whe NoUdic Uegion. TheUe e[iVWV a VomeZhaW YagXe book b\ the Swedish 
VcholaU of UeligioXV VWXdieV T. SegeUVWedW (1934), Zho aWWempWV Wo look inWo BUadle\¶V concepW 
of value, valuation, judgement of value, and the question of the identity of value and reality. 
In Finland, the research on British Idealism was done by Airaksinen (1975a), who has written 
on BUadle\¶V meWaph\VicV (AiUakVinen, 1975b), dialecWicV (AiUakVinen, 1978), and Vome aVpecWV 
of his ethics (Airaksinen, 1976, 1977). A. Siitonen (1989) discusses the existence of 
XnknoZableV in BUadle\¶V philoVoph\. Before these works, the theories of British Idealists were 
only studied sporadically and in a very general manner (e.g. J.E. Salomaa, 1929). They were 
not accessible to the international philosophical community due to the language barrier.  
 
 40 
is an appearance (which does not imply that it does not exist). Despite that, in 
ES the self is treated as if it was real. The overall message of the book is that, 
even though the self is just a mental construct, without it, ethics and moral life 
is impossible. Therefore, for the treatment of moral questions, we have to 
think as if the Velf ZaV Ueal. The ne[W WaVk iV Wo WU\ Wo UeconVWUXcW BUadle\¶V 
account of the moral self (more specifically, the morally relevant features of 
the self), which is distinct from the metaphysical account of the self.  
When committing the mistake of applying BUadle\¶V meWaph\Vical accoXnW of 
the self to ES, commentaries (e.g., Keene, 1970; MacNiven, 1987; Sprigge, 
1993; Wilson, 1999; Mander, 2016) tend to overlook the moral psychology 
context to which this discussion belongs. In order to address this issue, this 
diVVeUWaWion¶V VWUaWeg\ iV Wo UecUeaWe BUadle\¶V accoXnW of Whe moUal Velf, baVed 
on ES and the relevant moral discussions in moral psychology. 
Another common misinterpretation of the moral self in ES is to reduce it to a 
set of natural properties (such as a character or social roles) or states (e.g. a set 
of perceptions) (e.g., Nicholson, 1990; Mander, 2016; Stanley, 1996; Wilson, 
1999). This would imply that Bradley commits the naturalistic fallacy, which 
is not the case.  
Among the most interesting up-to-daWe inWeUpUeWaWionV of BUadle\¶V 
metaphysical views on the self, one could refer to the following sources. In his 
dissertation, D.R. De Witt (1984) argues that the fact that Bradley classifies the 
self as an appearance is not a good reason for discrediting his metaphysical 
account of the self. The reason is that, despite the widespread 
miVXndeUVWanding, Wo be an appeaUance, foU BUadle\, doeV noW mean ³Wo be 
XnUeal, an illXVion, and XnimpoUWanW´ (De WiWW, 1984, p. 30). G. VandeU VeeU 
(1970) offeUV a cUiWical e[poViWion of BUadle\¶V meWaph\VicV of Whe Velf. D. 
Pugmire (1996) shows that neither is memory seen by Bradley as providing the 
unity of the self, nor does feeling have the power to justify the reality of the self.  
In the context of his metaphysical discussion of the relationship between an 
individual and the state, Stanley (1996) touches upon the idea of the individual 
and its relation to the concept of the self in ES:  
In spite of these concerns we find in ES a compelling account of the individual as 
a fiction²the unreal side of a self which finds its moral realization in its station 
in the life of a real community, and its religious fulfilment in losing that bad 
individuality and finding oneness with God (Stanley, 1966, p. 55). 
Having mentioned the term moral self, however, Stanley does not offer any 
deepeU anal\ViV. P. BaVile (2003) WUaceV BUadle\¶V meWaph\Vical accoXnW of 
the self back to D. Hume, and makes analogies to W. James. Basile, however, 
does not discuss how the Humean concepW of ³Whe Velf Zhich [iV] baVed Xpon 
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Whe UecogniWion WhaW ZhaW iV baVic iV Whe flX[ of e[peUienced conWenWV´ (BaVile, 
2003, p. 96) relates to ES, where Bradley clearly rejects this account of the 
self. F. Wilson (1999) picks up this topic, relating BUadle\ Wo ³Whe empiUical 
diVcXVVion of Whe deYelopmenWal pV\cholog\ of Whe Velf´ (WilVon, 1999, p. 6) 
b\ J. BaldZin, W. WXndW, and J.F. HeUbaUW. WilVon WUaceV BUadle\¶V YieZ of 
the self in ES to Hume and Hobbes. However, he acknowledges the paradox 
of attUibXWing Whe HXmean ³bXndle YieZ´ Wo BUadle\, Vince BUadle\ cleaUl\ 
disagrees with it in ES. Wilson explains the paradox away by clarifying that 
the difference between Bradley and Hume is that, while for Hume the self is 
a mere heap of perceptions, for Bradley, as well as for Herbart, it is a 
VWUXcWXUed Zhole, ZheUe enWiWieV VWand in UelaWion Wo each oWheU: ³FoU HeUbaUW 
the ties are mechanical; for Bradley there is no such restriction on the ties 
that bind, on the relations that structure. For Bradley, the relations are as 
Whe\ aUe pUeVenWed´ (WilVon, 1999, p. 16). WilVon iV UighW WhaW Whe Velf in ES 
is a relational unity, but his solution to the paradox appears to be 
XnVaWiVfacWoU\. To UedXce BUadle\¶V aUgXmenW againVW Whe bXndle WheoU\ 
merely to a disagreement about the nature of the relations of perceptions, is 
Wo fail Wo Wake BUadle\¶V aUgXmenW VeUioXVl\ enoXgh. WilVon¶V inWeUpUeWaWion 
failV Wo acknoZledge WhaW BUadle\¶V cUiWiciVm iV WaUgeWed aW Whe naWXUaliVWic 
account of the self for morality, i.e. against the reduction of the moral self to 
a set of psychological states.  
Wollheim (1969) is one of the few to point out the apparent disagreement 
between AR and ES on Whe Wopic of Whe Velf. HaYing VXmmed Xp BUadle\¶V 
discussion of the self in AR, Wollheim notes that one could object to it by 
Va\ing WhaW WheUe iV aW leaVW one conWe[W in BUadle\¶V philoVoph\ ZheUe Ze haYe 
to admit the existence of the self, and this is morality. Its existence is a 
necessary presupposition of moral experience. This comment is especially 
important because it hints at the apparent difference in the use of the concept 
of Whe Velf in BUadle\¶V meWaph\Vical and eWhical ZoUkV. Wollheim, hoZeYer, 
conclXdeV WhaW BUadle\¶V Uepl\ Wo WhiV objecWion iV noW Wo Va\ WhaW Whe moUall\ 
relevant concept of the self is different from an ontological one, but to claim 
that, since the metaphysical account of the self involves a contradiction, this 
explains why morality also remains a contradiction. 
C.A.M. Keene¶V (1970) diVVeUWaWion ³F.H. BUadle\¶V TheoU\ of Whe Self´ iV a 
V\VWemaWic VWXd\ of Whe concepW of Whe Velf in BUadle\¶V philoVoph\. IW iV 
important because it shows the significance of the topic and its relevance to all 
aVpecWV of BUadle\¶V philoVoph\. Keen ZUiWeV: ³ThaW Whe Wopic of Whe Velf 
occXpieV a cenWUal poViWion in BUadle\¶V philoVoph\ iV aWWeVWed noW onl\ b\ iWV 
multi-dimensional development but by its presence throughout all his major 
publicationV aV Zell´ (Keene, 1970, p. 89). AcknoZledging WhaW BUadle\¶V YieZ 
on the self is by no means systematic, Keen nonetheless outlines a unified 
theory of the self, which consists of five ways in which Bradley attempts to 
conceptualise the self: metaphysics, social philosophy, moral philosophy, 
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philoVoph\ of Ueligion, and pV\cholog\. Keen acknoZledgeV WhaW ³[W]he cenWUal 
position of the self in Ethical Studies is readily secured, since the work is 
chiefly concerned with discovering the nature of the self to be realized in 
moUaliW\´ (Keene, 1970, p. 89). HoZeYeU, Whe diVWincWion beWZeen Whe 
metaphysical and moral selves remains analytically insufficient, resulting in, 
on one hand, a confusion as to the nature of the moral self in ES and its 
reducibility to social roles and our relations to others, as well as our 
psychological states, such as desires, interests, and pleasure or pain; and, on 
the other hand, a blurred distinction between the moral self, the ideal self, the 
true self, and the good will. However, the VWUong Vide of Keene¶V inWeUpUeWaWion 
is the accent on the importance of development and teleology for the 
discussion of moral selfhood in ES. 
MacNiYen (1987) placeV BUadle\¶V concepWV of Velfhood and peUVonaliW\ in Whe 
context of moral psychology. Rather than offering a definition or an account 
of the moral self in ES, MacNiven attempts to reconstruct various aspects of 
selfhood which are relevant to morality. Special attention is paid to the idea of 
the teleological development of the self and its implicaWionV foU one¶V moUal life 
(divided into stages: egoistical hedonism, institutionalism, personalism, and 
metaphysical mysticism). Despite his use of confusing terminology at times, 
MacNiven discusses morally relevant aspects of selfhood in connection with 
VXch concepWV aV deViUe, moUal agenc\, YiUWXe, and YalXe. MacNiYen¶V 
somewhat vague argument that Bradley does not commit the naturalistic 
fallacy has important implications for the study of moral selfhood in ES, on 
which the current dissertation builds²the interpretation of the moral self in 
ES is in non-naturalistic terms. MacNiven shows that Bradley does not derive 
his claim that self-realisation is the moral goal from psychological or scientific 
pUemiVeV, b\ compaUing BUadle\¶V defence of Whe pUinciple of self-realisation to 
Mill¶V defence of Whe pUinciple of XWiliW\ and Whe diVcXVVion of BUadle\¶V YieZV 
on logic and deductive and inductive reasoning. Even though MacNiven is 
right to argue that Bradley is not committing the naturalistic fallacy, his 
justification is based on a less important consideration, and his argument is 
somewhat confusing and appears to miss the point. A better strategy to show 
that Bradley is not committing a naturalistic fallacy is based on the popular 
opinion that Bradley identifies moral obligation with social duties. The 
aUgXmenW in BUadle\¶V defence ZoXld When (1) ciWe paUWV of ES that show 
BUadle\¶V accepWance of HXme¶V laZ (no oXghW fUom iV), and (2) ZoXld 
demonstrate that Bradley rejects the identification of the social with moral, 
while defending the identification of the moral with ideal (the strategy 
employed by the author of this dissertation in the first dissertation article). 
That Bradley is not deriving the claim that self-realisation is the moral end 
from scientific or psychological principles is self-evident, since Bradley claims 
in Essay II that moral self-UealiVaWion iV Whe end in iWVelf. MacNiYen¶V book 
would benefit from a detailed analysis of the relationship between psychology 
and ethics in ES, which remains somewhat sketchy.  
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Nicholson (1990) agrees that ES focuses on the concept of the self and self-
realisation. In the context of the discussion of the morally relevant concept of 
the self in ES, iW iV ZoUWh menWioning NicholVon¶V inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V 
claim that to be moral one has to become a true infinite whole by entering a true 
infiniWe Zhole. AUgXing againVW M. WaUnock¶V (1971) claim WhaW BUadle\ heUe 
simply denies personal individuality, Nicholson suggests that Bradley instead 
revises the idea of individuality as exclusiveness, separateness from oWheUV: ³HiV 
argument seems anti-individualistic only if the individual, the self, is conceived 
atomistically as being self-contained and complete in himself and thus capable 
of being an infiniWe Zhole in iVolaWion fUom oWheU VelYeV´ (NicholVon, 1990, p. 
14). AccoUding Wo NicholVon, BUadle\¶V alWeUnaWiYe iV Whe Vocial accoXnW of Whe 
Velf, ZheUe Velf iV ZhaW iW iV onl\ in UelaWion Wo oWheUV. I belieYe WhaW NicholVon¶V 
inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V claim inVXfficienWl\ diVWingXiVheV beWZeen Whe 
natural and moral selves. Bradley is talking about the moral self. Here Bradley 
outlines, in a general manner, his account of the moral self, or the self we ought 
to realise. When he says that our moral self is a true infinite whole, he does not 
deny that the physical and psychological aspects of our personalities can differ. 
Instead he, ultimately, rephrases the Kantian universalizability thesis: my moral 
self is identical to the self of any other person in the way moral requirements 
apply to it. To join the true-infinite whole is thus to identify oneself with this 
universalizable moral self, to accept and truly believe in the universalizability of 
moral norms and requirements.  
T.L.S. Sprigge (1993) thoroughly reviews the idea of the self in the various 
works of Bradley. Without going so far as to distinguish between the moral 
concept of the self and the metaphysical one, Sprigge notes the striking 
difference in the way Bradley conceptualises the self in AR and in ES: 
³BUadle\¶V laWeU denial of Whe Velf mXVW haYe Veemed paUticularly strange to 
readers of Appearance and Reality (1893) who recalled the highly positive and 
interesting account of what it is in Ethical Studies (1876) and how self-
Ueali]aWion iV WheUe made Whe baViV of eWhicV´ (SpUigge, 1993, p. 512). DiVcXVVing 
ES, SpUigge WalkV aboXW BUadle\¶V concepW of peUVonaliW\ aV a concUeWe-
universal, and the way it is being constantly constructed in the process of self-
UealiVaWion: ³FoU BUadle\ Whe baViV of eWhicV lieV in Velf-realization because each 
of us is a concrete-universal which acts in the way which will best preserve 
itself and thereby move towards an ever more comprehensive and harmonious 
YeUVion of WhaW iW iV Vo faU´ (SpUigge, 1993, p. 518). ImpoUWanWl\, SpUigge (1988) 
hints at the idea of a specific type of teleological development that the concept 
of the moral self in ES presupposes:  
In his Ethical Studies Bradley takes his departure from the presumed fact that 
every individual is struggling for some kind of self realization, and that this is the 
basic driving force of the attempt to live a morally good life. Such a life is not a 
means to self realization, but one main form of self-realization. By self realization 
Bradley seems to mean the giving some sort of overall coherent pattern or 
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structure to your life in which you can find satisfaction, and such that all the 
details of your life are enjoyed as particular elements in that total pattern. One 
could perhaps say that it is life in the light of an accurate self image with which 
one can be satisfied (Sprigge, 1988, p. 117).  
Standing on similar ground, Article II develops an account of the moral self in 
terms of a project.  
MandeU (e.g., 2016) emphaViVeV WhaW BUadle\¶V moUal WheoU\ cenWUeV on Whe 
concept of selfhood, and sees the aim of the moral life in the full realisation of 
the potential of the self, i.e. self-realisation. A collection of articles edited by 
Mander and S. Panagakou (2016) overview various idealistic theories of 
selfhood and moral agency in relation to such concepts as responsibility and 
normatiYiW\. AV Whe ediWoUV UighWfXll\ noWe ³[W]he enWiUe aUgXmenW of Ethical 
Studies « ma\ be inWeUpUeWed aV an aWWempW Wo aUWicXlaWe and defend a VenVe of 
µWhe moUal Velf¶´ (2016, 7), Zhich XndeUlineV oXU XndeUVWanding of moUal 
responsibility. This dissertation¶V AUWicle II iV pXbliVhed in Whe afoUemenWioned 
collection, and distinguishes between the natural self and moral self in ES. 
Mander VWUeVVeV Whe impoUWance of Whe concepW of Whe moUal Velf in hiV ³IdealiVW 
EWhicV´ (MandeU, 2016, pp. 116±120), and in hiV papeU ³IdealiVm and Whe TUXe 
Self´ (in MandeU and PanagakoX (2016)) oXWlineV Whe geneUal WheoU\ of Whe Velf 
in British Idealism and conceptualises the idea of the moral self with reference 
to the concept of the true and ideal selves. Distinguishing between the moral 
self, true self, and ideal self is an interesting conceptual problem (because 
Bradley himself was not clear with his terminology, the terms are often 
confused or used interchangeably in the secondary sources). Mander points 
oXW WhaW, foU idealiVWV like CaiUd, Whe WUXe Velf iV e[plained aV ³a UicheU and 
higheU leYel of Velfhood´ (MandeU and PanagakoX, 2016, p. 289). OXU WUXe 
selYeV aUe ³Zho, aW heaUW, Ze Ueall\ aUe´ (MandeU 2016, p. 158), cloVe Wo M. 
HeideggeU¶V idea of aXWhenWic life. The WUXe Velf iV UedXced Wo a VeW of 
chaUacWeUiVWicV: (1) Whe peUVon¶V Uole in VocieW\ and heU UelaWion Wo oWheU people, 
(2) rationality, (3) a unity with the divine. This being so for many British 
Idealists, I however find it doubtful that Bradley would pursue this sort of 
UedXcWion. The ideal Velfhood, on Whe oWheU hand, iV inWeUpUeWed aV being ³ZideU 
than the strictly moral Velf´ (MandeU, 2016, p. 176) and as representing an 
image of a perfect individual. Only by reference to my ideal self am I able to 
know what my actual duty is. Article II of this dissertation analyses and 
elaborates on the difference between the true and ideal selves.  
 
Desire  
DeVpiWe iWV cUXcial Uole foU Whe XndeUVWanding of BUadle\¶V eWhicV, WheUe iV haUdl\ 
any contemporary commentary on or analysis of his concept of desire²a 
 45 
lacuna that the present dissertation fills in Articles III±V. The general 
approach to the treatment of desire in this thesis is in the spirit of the following 
approaches. Crossley (1989) acknowledges the role of desire in the process of 
self-UealiVaWion Zhile diVcXVVing Whe Uole of feeling in BUadle\¶V eWhicV. FocXVing 
mostly on Green, Mander (2016, pp. 48±53) outlines a general idealist view of 
desire. This view blurs the distinction between desire and belief as 
psychological states, claiming that there is a cognitive element in desire, and a 
conative element in belief.  
Mander (2016; 2011, p. 185) also acknowledges the central role of desire that 
BUadle\ aWWUibXWeV Wo a peUVon¶V moUal life. We agUee in Whe inWeUpUeWaWion of 
BUadle\¶V claim WhaW Whe onl\ Whing WhaW a peUVon ma\ ZanW iV one¶V Velf: iW 
means that rather than desiring X, the person desires to be as someone with 
Whe aWWUibXWe of haYing X (cf. WhiV diVVeUWaWion¶V AUWicle III). In WhiV VenVe, 
desires drive moral self-realisation. Mander further suggests that moral self-
realisation is achieved not via a chain of disconnected desires but through a 
systematic unity of desires:  
One way to appreciate that it is not merely trivial to place all our desires under 
the single heading of self-realization is to note that this introduces a real and 
obVeUYable XniW\ among Whem. [«] The\ Zillto a large degreecohere and 
harmonize with one another precisely because they are all referred back to a 
common self with a certain character (Mander, 2016, p. 157). 
Dissertation Article IV develops a similar idea of a train of desires, and the idea 
of grand desire. MandeU callV WhiV Whe ³ideal deViUe-VeW´ (MandeU, 2016, p. 66), 
or an ideal desire which, for him, encompasses the idea of desirability. The 
desires that are less than ideal do not necessarily have good as their object, and 
therefore may lead to bad moral choices. According to Mander, for Bradley as 
an idealist ethicist, such desires must be caused by our true self (rational, 
social, and divine). Brink (2007) notes that Bradley defines desire in ES in 
terms of direction of fit, where what is has to be changed in order to fit an idea. 
According to MacNiven (1987), the concept of desire is both important for 
BUadle\¶V eWhicV and comple[. He diVWingXiVheV iW fUom pleaVXUe and pain, and 
inWeUpUeWV BUadle\¶V WenVion-based explanation of desires as introducing its 
dispositional nature. However, despite an attempt to connect desire and will, 
MacNiven fails to show that, for Bradley, will equals a realised desire.  
Although pointing to the right direction, the existing commentary on the role 
of deViUe in BUadle\¶V eWhicV remains rather patchy. What is lacking is a detailed 
and in-depWh anal\ViV WhaW Zill UeconVWUXcW BUadle\¶V accoXnW of deViUe (AUWicle 
III±IV), distinguish it from related concepts such as conation, wish, and need 
(Article III), and determine its role in BUadle\¶V YieZ on Whe moUal life of an 
individual (Article I, III, V). This dissertation takes the topic further, and 
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suggests distinguishing a special type of desire, grand desire, which plays the 
key role in guiding the entire moral life of the individual (Article IV). 
 
Moral motivation, feelings, and emotions 
If liWeUaWXUe on deViUe in BUadle\¶V philoVoph\ iV VpaUVe, WheUe iV haUdl\ 
anything written on his account of moral motivation. The reason for this might 
be the fact that Bradley has not dealt with the topic in any extensive manner. 
It is possible, however, to find fragmentary commentary on relevant topics, 
VXch aV moUal beliefV and jXdgemenWV. BUadle\¶V YieZV on moUal emoWionV aUe 
hardly discussed in the secondary literature. One can, however, find useful 
diVcXVVion of Whe concepW of feeling in BUadle\¶V philoVoph\, albeiW liWWle haV 
been written specifically on feeling in ES. Mander (2017) discusses the role of 
emoWion in BUadle\¶V aUgXmenWaWion foU hiV meWaeWhical and eWhical pUincipleV. 
James Bradley (1984, 1985; 1996) focuses on the metaphysical account of 
feeling and distinguishes it from pleasure, pain, and emotion. Pugmire (1996) 
talks about the relation between feeling and the self. Ferreira (1999) 
distinguishes between the notions of feeling and immediate experience. K.H. 
Sievers (2002) and Crossley (2003) discuss some of the essential 
characteristics of feeling in detail. Basile (2004) offers an epistemological 
interpretation of feeling as the transcendental foundation of knowledge. The 
most interesting for the goals of the present thesis are the works by MacNiven 
(1984) and²even more so²by Crossley (1989), who focus on ES and the role 
of feeling and felW haUmon\/conWUadicWion in a peUVon¶V moUal life and 
BUadle\¶V moUal pV\cholog\. AccoUding Wo CUoVVle\, feeling iV a cUiWeUion of 
right action and self-UealiVaWion; iW iV eVVenWial foU BUadle\¶V YieZV on moUal 
development, moral knowledge, and moral judgement, and he observes that 
the latter is based on ideas that are felt (Crossley, 1989, p. 50). This thesis picks 
Xp CUoVVle\¶V ZoUk and deepenV Whe inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V YieZV on moUal 
judgement and its role in moral motivation.  
 
Moral judgements 
It is well acknowledged in the secondary literature that Bradley defines moral 
judgements as non-discursive²K. Nielsen (1977) examines the implications of 
this distinction in more detail²but there is hardly any attempt to reconstruct 
and anal\Ve BUadle\¶V accoXnW in an\ VignificanW deWail. Some ideaV can, 
however, be useful in inspiring a promising approach to the interpretation of 
moral judgement in Bradley. For example, Sprigge relates moral judgements 
to self-realisation (Sprigge, 1993, p. 517). Crossley suggests a way in which 
moral judgements can be true or false: moral judgements involve felt ideas (for 
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more on felt moral judgement, Kendal 1982), which, when in 
harmony/discord with other ideas, serve as a basis for moral judgements 
yielding the truth (Crossley, 1989, p. 50). In MacNiven, one can find the 
indication that moral judgements differ at the various stages of moral 
development (MacNiven, 1987, pp. 163, 170). K.E. Aspevig (1982) describes 
moral judgements as perceptions, and emphasises their role in advancing self-
realisation (Aspevig, 1982, pp. 135±136). T. Segerstedt (1934) discusses 
BUadle\¶V YieZV on Whe jXdgemenW of YalXe, alWhoXgh TXiWe YagXel\.  
The UeVeaUch on moUal jXdgemenW in BUadle\¶V eWhicV, hoZeYeU, should start 
with an analysis of its elements: Does it consist of a belief only, or involve an 
emotive element as well? What does Bradley say on the nature of moral belief 
and emotions? Does moral judgment motivate by itself, or does Bradley believe 
that to be moWiYaWed Wo acW in accoUdance ZiWh one¶V moUal jXdgmenW one alVo 
needs a desire? These questions are addressed in Article V. 
 
The moral significance of My Station and Its Duties 
DeVpiWe Whe facW WhaW ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ (MSID) iV one of Whe most 
commenWed Xpon WopicV in BUadle\¶V moUal philoVoph\, iW iV haUd Wo find an in-
depth analysis that would adequately examine its role in ethics. An extended 
literature review on this topic can be found in Article I. Here, I will only briefly 
review the main approaches.  
1) A vulgar reductionist approach, that identifies the theory that Bradley calls 
µm\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV¶ in EVVa\ V ZiWh hiV oZn moUal WheoU\ (e.g., RaVhdall, 
1907; Sabine, 1915; Santayana, 1933; Stebbing, 1948; Krook, 1959; Hudson, 
1980; MacIntyre, 1998), which is further connected to conservativism (more 
on this Nicholson, 1984, pp. 129±130, n.1) and communitarianism (cf. 
Simmons, 2001, pp. 80±81, n. 38). According to this view, there is nothing 
moUe Wo BUadle\¶V eWhicV Whan Whe dXWieV of one¶V VWaWion. ThiV YieZ iV noZada\V 
Zidel\ UejecWed, and BUadle\¶V non-conservativism is well examined in 
Nicholson (1990, pp. 39±49) (see also Sprigge, 1988). 
2) A supplementing approach (e.g., Wollheim, 1969; Warnock, 1971; Candlish, 
1978; Bell, 1984; Sprigge, 1988; Nicholson, 1990; Brink, 2007; Mander, 2011), 
which, albeit with variations, can be summarised in the following way: at the 
coUe of BUadle\¶V moUal philoVoph\ iV Whe WheViV WhaW peUVonV, dXe Wo WheiU Vocial 
nature, can achieve moral self-realisation only as a part of a social whole, and 
that our duties come from the station we occupy. Recognising obvious ethical 
problems with this thesis, Bradley supplements or amends it in Essay VI by 
the introduction of non-social ideals, the realisation of which also has moral 
significance. As I argue, this interpretation of MSID is problematic at least, in 
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WhaW iW iV noW Vpecified ZhaW VoUW of amendmenWV aUe XndeUWaken Wo UendeU ³m\ 
VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ plaXVible aV a moral theory. The supplementing view 
eiWheU XndeUeVWimaWeV Whe Vignificance of BUadle\¶V cUiWiciVm of Whe WheoU\, oU 
assumes that Bradley did not take his own criticism too seriously. This 
appUoach failV Wo VXfficienWl\ diffeUenWiaWe MSID WheoU\¶V noUmaWiYe WheViV, 
which Bradley rejects, and the revised MSID thesis, which he accepts. The 
moral significance of the ideal point of view is downplayed, and the fact that 
the first component of the moral ideal is a normative concept (referring to 
norms of interpersonal relationships), and not a descriptive concept (referring 
to positional duties), is overlooked.  
3) A downplaying approach, which tends to differentiate the theory that 
BUadle\ callV ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ fUom hiV oZn eWhical YieZV deVcUibed 
XndeU Whe WiWle ³ideal moUaliW\´ (e.g., MacNiven, 1996; James Bradley, 1996; 
Ilodigwe, 2004), and considers the latter as a theory in its own right. The 
essential difference between the two theories is that, in ideal morality, moral 
agenc\ iV no longeU idenWified ZiWh one¶V Vocial Velf oU one¶V VWaWion, and Vocial 
commands are not identical with moral requirements. As the existing literature 
still lacks an analytic interpretation and thorough, detailed, explanation of 
³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´, i.e. an anal\ViV of Whe WeUm WhaW VpellV oXW its specific 
WheVeV and claimV, e[plainV connecWionV beWZeen Whem, and VpecifieV BUadle\¶V 
position towards them, this doctoral thesis fills in this lacuna in Article I.  
 
Moral obligation 
LiWWle haV been Vaid on Whe naWXUe of obligaWion in BUadle\¶V eWhicV. SWeUn¶V 
(2013, p. 300) idea that Bradley, along with Hegel, subscribes to a social 
command account of obligation does not stand scrutiny and, as Mander (2016, 
p. 164) notes, is refuted by the text of ES. Mander suggests that, for Bradley, 
moral obligation folloZV fUom a peUVon¶V Vocial idenWiW\ UaWheU Whan fUom 
³Vocial pUeVVXUe´. ObligaWion iV Whe coeUcion of oXU WUXe Velf (oU Vocial Velf) oYeU 
oXU YaUioXV deViUeV: ³WhaW iV noUmaWiYe aboXW m\ Vocial idenWiW\ iV WhaW iW iV 
my true and complete identity, which gives it authority over any apparent or 
partial identity. And thus our social part or station does not simply specify for 
XV oXU dXWieV, iW alVo e[plainV WheiU obligaWoUineVV´ (MandeU, 2016, p. 165). 
Arguing that Bradley does not reduce social to moral, this doctoral dissertation 
cannoW accepW MandeU¶V inWeUpUeWaWion of Whe moUal obligaWion in ES. Another 
account is offered, according to which moral obligation is explained through 
the identification of the self with the moral ideal, rather than the social self. 
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I begin (Article I) b\ anal\Ving Whe comple[ phUaVe ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ 
into a number of theses and subordinate claims, and challenge the common 
assumption that, for Bradleyd, social requirements equal moral obligations. 
Having undermined the long-standing belief in the literature about the central 
Uole of ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´, I WXUn Wo Whe ke\ concepW of ES, namel\ Whe 
moral self, which I explain in terms of personal projects (Article II). The 
concept is further analysed in Articles III and IV. Article III focuses on the 
concepW of Whe moUal Velf in UelaWion Wo BUadle\¶V accoXnW of deViUe. AUWicle IV 
VXggeVWV WhaW gUand deViUeV, i.e. deViUeV diUecWed aW an ideal of one¶V peUVonaliW\, 
aUe impoUWanW foU Whe XndeUVWanding of BUadle\¶V idea of Velf-realisation and 
moUal life. The final aUWicle UeconVWUXcWV BUadle\¶V YieZV on moUal moWiYaWion 
and the nature of moral beliefs.  
MoUe Vpecificall\, Whe goal of Whe fiUVW aUWicle, ³BUadle\¶V µM\ SWaWion and IWs 
DXWies¶ and iWV moUal (in)Vignificance´, iV Wo VeWWle Whe TXeVWion aboXW Whe Uole 
of Whe idea of ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ in BUadle\¶V eWhicV. BXilding Xpon Whe 
insights of such interpreters as MacNiven, James Bradley, and Ilodigwe, I 
argue for the need to downpla\ Whe Vignificance of ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ 
in ES, the focal point of which is ideal morality. I argue, however, that in order 
to answer this question, one must start with a thorough analysis of the phrase 
³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ and Whe conWexts in which it appears in ES, because 
it refers to a number of different theses, each of which plays a different role in 
ES. I show that interpretations of ES WhaW WUeaW ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ aV a 
single (and often vaguely defined) thesis are problematic and fail to make 
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VenVe of BUadle\¶V idea of ideal moUaliW\. I aUgXe WhaW, depending on Whe 
conWe[W, Whe phUaVe ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ ma\ UefeU Wo: 1) Whe Hegelian 
ethics of Sittlichkeit, i.e. a theory that Bradley rejects, 2) a revised thesis that 
he accepts, and 3) positional duties. Moreover, the same phrase may refer to 
one of the following theses: 1) a descriptive thesis that it is a matter of fact, and 
supported by cultural and historical observations, that society has authority 
over an individual, determining what she is and, through laws and custom, 
dictating what she ought to do; 2) a normative thesis according to which 
existing social institutions, such as law and custom, generate moral 
requirements²what one ought to do is fully determined by the requirements 
of one¶V VocieW\; 3) an ideal WheViV, accoUding Wo Zhich moUaliW\ conViVWV of Whe 
realisation of the self, identified with the moral ideal. Each of these theses is 
further analysed into a number of claims, some of which Bradley accepts, some 
rejects. For example, it is shown that, depending on the context, the ideal 
thesis may refer to a claim that Bradley rejects, namely to the bottom-up 
idealisation claim, according to which what ought to be is reduced to the 
existing social phenomena, or to the claim which Bradley accepts, namely to 
the top-down idealisation claim, according to which reality has to be changed 
in oUdeU Wo meeW a VWandaUd. BecaXVe BUadle\ findV Hegel¶V boWWom-up 
idealisation strategy unsatisfactory, I argue that we have reason to believe that 
he does not reduce the moral sphere to the social, and does not identify moral 
obligation with social requirement. I further argue that Bradley identifies the 
moral point of view with an ideal point of view. The fact that Bradley includes 
³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ in hiV moUal ideal mXVW be XndeUVWood aV amoXnWing 
to a claim that a positional duty is morally obligatory only when it is justified 
by the norms governing pre-institutionalised relationships.  
After shifting the focus of Whe book aZa\ fUom ³m\ VWaWion and iWV dXWieV´ and 
showing the subordinate role of the social point of view to the moral point of 
YieZ, I pUoceed Wo UeconVWUXcW BUadle\¶V YieZV on moUal Velf-realisation. In the 
Vecond aUWicle, ³BUadle\¶V ConcepWion of Whe MoUal Self: A NeZ Reading´, I 
suggest that the central concept of ES is that of the moral self. Its key role is 
eYidenW fUom Whe facW WhaW Whe enWiUe book¶V VWUXcWXUe eYolYeV aUoXnd iW. The 
book also employs a rich vocabulary, distinguishing between various aspects of 
the moral self. In the paper, I argue against a naturalistic interpretation of the 
concept of the moral self in ES and VhoZ WhaW, deVpiWe BUadle\¶V confXVing Za\ 
of writing, it cannot be seen as reducible to psychological facts about a moral 
agent, such as a set of beliefs, desires, or habits. I further distinguish between 
the moral self or the principle of universalizability and my moral self, which I 
argue is best understood in terms of personal projects, or life-long conscious 
pursuits of major goals that give our life meaning and organise it (distinct from 
a life plan). I analyse these pursuits into a horizontal project or the pursuit of 
one¶V WUXe Velf, and a YeUWical pUojecW oU Whe concepWXaliVaWion of one¶V XlWimaWe 
 51 
moral end in terms of the ideal self.16 These two processes are interrelated and 
infoUm each oWheU. I e[plain Whe WUXe Velf aV a coheUenW XniW\ of agenW¶V 
reasonable commitments that are subject to rational re-evaluation, and argue 
against identifying the true self as a model or image of a perfect human being, 
or with loyalty to one goal. The category of the ideal self collects together a set 
of commitments that are worth having: 1) commitments grounded in our 
relations with other people, 2) commitments to ways of treating others by 
YiUWXe of WheiU being hXmanV, 3) commiWmenWV Wo WUXWh and beaXW\. A peUVon¶V 
moral self is a mega-project that consists in acting upon our reasonable 
commitments (horizontal project) and understanding what commitments are 
reasonable to have in the view of the ideal self (vertical project). 
The WhiUd aUWicle, ³F.H. BUadle\, DeViUe, and Whe Self´, openV Xp Whe diVcXVVion 
aboXW Whe Uole of deViUe in BUadle\¶V YieZ of one¶V moUal life and moUal Velf-
realisation. The goal of the paper is to reconstruct and inWeUpUeW BUadle\¶V 
account of desire, based on his ES and minor psychological papers. I argue that 
Bradley develops a unique and up-to-date account of desire, which is best 
interpreted in terms of a narrative. As such, desires are essentially realisers of 
personal projects and are linked to ideals, which explains their central role in 
moral self-realisation. I begin by showing that, despite his tension-centred 
explanation of desire (according to which, desire is essentially a tension 
between the pleasant feeling of being affirmed in the idea of possession of a 
certain property and a presently experienced painful state), Bradley rejects the 
diVpoViWional accoXnW of deViUe. DiVpoViWion Wo acWion oU ³WU\ing Wo geW´, ³Whe 
e[peUienced VWUiYing of m\Velf´ iV identified with conation, which Bradley 
distinguishes from desire per se. To desire an object does not necessarily 
inYolYe WU\ing Wo bUing iW aboXW \oXUVelf. I fXUWheU VhoZ WhaW BUadle\¶V 
distinction between conation and desire is not reducible to the distinction 
between the disposition to act and a wish. Bradley has a well-developed 
account of wish, which he clearly distinguishes from desire proper. Wish is 
essentially a counterfactual desire: it is a desire I would have if the world would 
have been otherwise. The object of a wish is a possible world in which the 
conditions for the satisfaction of the desire are such that they cannot be met in 
the real world. On the contrary, in desire proper the object is a possible world 
in which the desire can be satisfied. I argue that the way to understand the 
concept of desire in Bradley is to interpret two of his claims: first, that the only 
object of desire is the self, and second, that desire is an identification of the self 
with an object. I suggest that the former implies that all desires are in some 
sense motivated or otherwise connected to our aspiration and personal 
concerns, in other words, personal projects. This claim should not be confused 
with psychological egoism. What Bradley means is that any desire, be it self- or 
other-regarding, can be accounted for by the means of a narrative that connects 
the object of desire and the future state of the self. Our desires tell a story about 
 
16 The true self is a realized ideal self. 
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or represent ourselves. The object of our desire bears connection to ourselves 
in such a way that it qualifies what we are; it informs about the qualities that 
we care to have. The desired properties of an object are ascribed to it because 
Whe\ aUe impoUWanW Wo oXU oZn life pUojecWV. I connecW BUadle\¶V definiWion of 
desire as an identification of the self with the object to his statement that 
UealiVed deViUe iV an ³XWWeUance´ of Whe Velf´, oU WhaW Whe Velf feelV ³aVVeUWed´ in 
the object of desire. I interpret these statements as a claim that desire consists 
in a story about the attractive properties of an object. To identify is to accept 
that the object is valuable for myself. The identification can be dispositional 
(appearing in the presence of an object) or more permanent (present regardless 
the presence of an object), which explains the difference between appetites and 
VWanding deViUeV (inWeUeVW and lXVW). I inWeUpUeW BUadle\¶V ³Whe Zhole of endV´ aV 
the idea that a life of a person can retrospectively be said to consist of a grand 
pUojecW WhaW XnifieV a peUVon¶V paUWicXlaU deViUeV and ends and realises a certain 
idealised image of herself: the object of her grand desire. At the end, I address 
a challenge that Bradley faces. His view of desire incorporates elements of the 
account of desire as lack; something that is being missed. The latter account 
can be said to confuse desires and needs. I show that Bradley does not commit 
the fallacy, since in his description the lack refers to incompleteness (of the 
self-image in the absence of the desire property of the object) and not to the 
lack as deficiency, which is essential to the concept of need.  
In Whe foXUWh aUWicle, ³GUand DeViUeV and MoUal Life: An InWeUpUeWaWion of F.H. 
BUadle\´, I look moUe cloVel\ aW Whe idea of a gUand deViUe. I inWUodXce WhiV 
concept as a helpful tool for the inWeUpUeWaWion of BUadle\¶V YieZ on moUal life. 
Even though Bradley does not use the concept explicitly, I argue it is latent in 
his works and is key for the understanding of the process by which a person is 
able to realise the moral ideal in her concrete actions. I defend my 
interpretation against an objection that there is no need in the postulation of 
gUand deViUe, and Ze can e[plain BUadle\¶V YieZ of moUal life ZiWh UefeUence Wo 
one supreme desire for the moral ideal itself. The core of my argument is that 
such a supreme desire is either of questionable moral worth, because it 
becomeV a pXUVXiW of Whe XniW\ of one¶V peUVonaliW\ ZiWh no UeVpecW Wo iWV 
content, or it eventually collapses into a desire to become an ideal person, 
which I call a grand desire. I explain grand desires as a special kind of morally 
significant and self-contained desire²the object of which represents idealised 
qualities essential to our personalities²that play an essential role in organising 
our lives . They are desires to be a certain person, to such an extent that a 
change in one¶V gUand deViUeV enWailV a change of peUVonaliW\17. Grand desires 
are ambitious narratives, which are centred on the agent herself and create the 
best possible world in which the agent is attributed a valuable characteristic in 
its perfect form. They are like epic narratives where heroes are exceptionally 
 
17 One can Vee VimilaUiWieV ZiWh WilliamV¶ accoXnWV of inWegUiW\ (idenWiW\-conferring 
commiWmenWV) and caWegoUical deViUeV (i.e. Whe deViUeV WhaW giYe meaning Wo a peUVon¶V life and 
that are not conditional on hers being alive). See more, Williams (1973, 1976, 1981).  
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courageous or strong. I further claim that grand desires tend to realise 
themselves, that is to say, they tend to make the actual state of affairs 
correspond Wo oXU idealiVed YieZ of oXUVelYeV b\ inflXencing Whe agenW¶V 
psychological states (such as other desires, beliefs, emotions, etc.) and actions. 
Grand desires are narratives to live through, and they imply a transition from 
perceiving oneself as an idealised hero to actually living the narrative. This 
transition happens, I suggest, through identification, which in this case implies 
recognising as her own those physiological states which, she believes, are 
appropriate for the idealised person represented by the narrative of her grand 
desire. She starts considering them as defining what she is. Grand desires are 
morally significant because they tie moral ideals to our understanding of 
ourselves, and serve the realisation of these ideals. Being moral is, in the 
context of ES, a peUVon¶V all-encompassing, ultimate project, which is carried 
out through a chain of smaller, conditional sub-projects. Grand desires are also 
moUall\ VignificanW becaXVe Whe\ oUganiVe one¶V life inWo a concUeWe-universal 
whole. Such a whole is itself a totality of the particulars that instantiate, 
manifest, or represent it. In a grand desire, when my object is an ideal, I 
automatically desire the particulars that instantiate the ideal, and, as a result, 
I desire to be its instance. I ague that, for Bradley, a person can have several 
grand desires at the same time without posing a danger to her integrity, as long 
as these grand desires can be made a part of a coherent narrative. In the end, I 
discuss the problematic aspects of grand desires. They are difficult to satisfy, 
because their objects are so obscure that it is impossible to specify the 
conditions under which the ideal can be seen as sufficiently coinciding with 
reality. We can only approximate our ideals. 
The final aUWicle, ³On Moral Beliefs, Emotions, and Motivational 
Wholes: SkeWching F. H. BUadle\¶V AccoXnW of MoUal MoWiYaWion´, UeconVWUXcWV 
BUadle\¶V YieZV on moUal moWiYaWion, mainl\ baVed on hiV aUWicle ³Can a Man 
Sin againVW KnoZledge?´. I Uel\ on an anal\ViV of Whe VWUXcWXUe of the main 
aUgXmenWV of BUadle\¶V aUWicle. I make WZo main claimV: (a) accoUding Wo 
Bradley, moral beliefs produce motivation by themselves, without an 
assistance of desire, and (b) are non-overridable motivational factors. My 
argument for (a) is based on Whe UeconVWUXcWion of BUadle\¶V accoXnW of Whe 
nature of moral beliefs, which, in addition to a cognitive element, contain an 
emotive element. This emotive element²essentially reduced to the feelings of 
pain or pleasure²predisposes the agent to abstain from an action that she 
belieYeV Wo be ZUong, oU acW in Whe Za\ Vhe belieYeV Wo be UighW. BUadle\¶V YieZV 
on moral beliefs must be considered in the light of his definition of an idea (the 
eVVenWial elemenW in eYeU\ belief), Zhich BUadle\ defineV aV ³a UepUesentative 
Vign´. I e[plain WhaW, accoUding Wo BUadle\, Whe feeling of pain iV a neceVVaU\ 
VWUXcWXUal elemenW of Whe Vign ³moUall\ ZUong´, b\ Whe meanV of Zhich Whe 
meaning of moral wrongness is produced. It is a mental counterpart of the 
actual property of ZUongneVV. ThiV idea XndeUlineV BUadle\¶V diVWincWion 
between moral and non-moUal (diVcXUViYe) beliefV. If Whe idea ³X iV ZUong´ doeV 
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not produce a negative emotional response in the agent, then she entertains a 
discursive belief that X is wrong. In this type of belief, the wrongness is 
represented by another mental event such as an image. It does not predispose 
to an action; it merely represents a fact. In my argument for (b), I first explain 
ZhaW, in Whe conWe[W of ³Can a Man Sin againVW KnoZledge?´, iW means for a 
moUal belief Wo moWiYaWe. I anal\Ve Whe idea of Whe ³moWiYaWional Zhole´, Zhich 
refers to the idea that agents experience the simultaneous influence of multiple 
factors, all of which have a role in determining the outcome of the will. For 
Bradley, the question is whether, given all other motivational factors, the 
emotional component of the moral belief is able to win, and thus predispose 
Whe agenW Wo acW accoUdingl\ Wo WhiV belief. Then, I UefeU Wo BUadle\¶V e[planaWion 
of the cases where belief that an action is wrong fails to defeat competing 
motivational factors. In such cases, the agent cannot be said to have a proper 
moral belief. Instead, she has a belief in which the wrongness of an action, 
although called moral, is in fact treated as non-moral wrongness. For Bradley, 
when an agent perceives the action in its moral property, she cannot fail to be 
motivated, on the whole, by her belief. 
 
7. Afterword 
Having set the goal of reinterpreting the ethical views of Bradly in his ES, this 
dissertation project considers its main objectives achieved. To sum up briefly, 
iW haV been eVWabliVhed WhaW BUadle\¶V moUal idealiVm iV cenWUed on Whe concepW 
of the moral ideal and Whe claim WhaW Whe goal of one¶V moUal life iV Ueaching 
WoZaUdV one¶V ideal peUVonaliW\. The idea of moUal Velf-realisation suggests the 
essential role that our desires, aspirations, and commitments play in our moral 
life. Desires move the realisation of our moral projects. The emotive element 
is seen as a constitutive part of moral beliefs, which, for that reason, are seen 
as internally motivating. Commitments constitute our moral selves. A person 
is then morally good when she is acting upon her commitments and in 
accordance with the norm that govern the pre-institutionalised relationships 
underlying those commitments. It was argued that Bradley does not reduce 
the moral to the social sphere, and makes a distinction between moral 
obligations and social UeTXiUemenWV VXch aV Whe dXWieV peUWaining Wo one¶V 
social roles. Moreover, Bradley places moral considerations over social, seeing 
the former as a reason to criticise the latter. 
Given the richness of ES and the complexity of its topics, it is impossible to 
explore in detail all of the relevant questions in one dissertation. This 
dissertation focuses on the key topics essential for the understanding of the 
book in the context of moral philosophy and moral psychology, and thus lays 
down the foundation and creates a framework for further interpretation of 
BUadle\¶V eWhicV. The diVVeUWaWion mainl\ focXVeV on Whe accoXnW of moUal 
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selfhood and the morally good life; Bradley’s account of moral obligation and 
the role of positional duties in one’s moral life; and the question of moral 
motivation and the moral relevance of desire. The work done in the 
dissertation is significant in at least two respects. First, it shows the 
contemporary relevance of Bradley’s ethical idealism and reveals its relevance 
to modern discussions in normative ethics and metaethics, especially in 
connection with such topics as moral personhood, the role of personal projects 
in one’s life, the concept of desire and need, and moral motivation. Second, 
given the fact that ES is under-researched and greatly misunderstood, the 
dissertation provides the necessary groundwork and starting point for further 
analysis of Bradley’s ethics, without which there is no sense to even start 
evaluating Bradley’s contribution to the ethics of British Idealism and the 
history of ethics in general.  
From the perspective of the interpretation of ES offered in this dissertation, 
the most prominent topics for further research are the following. In the field 
of normative ethics, Bradley’s views on the moral good, as well as his claim 
that all moral duties are duties to oneself. In virtue ethics, Bradley’s account 
of virtue, moral character, and habit. In metaethics: Bradley’s view on the 
nature of moral properties; Bradley’s views on the nature of moral 
judgements; Bradley’s version of moral intuitionism; Bradley’s compatibilist 
view; and Bradley’s account of reasons for actions. Lastly, in the field of history 
of philosophy, the development of Bradley’s moral philosophy from ES to AR. 
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